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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Network Alignment in Healthcare: A Socio-Technical Approach for System-Wide 
Improvement and Patient Safety 
 
 
by 
 
 
Sarah M. Bonzo 
 
 
 
Chair: Jeffrey K. Liker 
 
 
 
Local process improvement efforts have permeated the healthcare industry, yet 
the ability to extend these improvements across the system continues to be a challenge. 
Coordinating services, or patient care, across organizational boundaries can be difficult 
and can impact leadership‘s ability to enable widespread organizational change.  This 
research presents a socio-technical approach to cross-unit coordination and system-wide 
improvement by forwarding a network alignment methodology that can aid in the 
identification of gaps throughout a system.  The proposed model examines the alignment 
of patient or diagnostic information flow, the technical flow network, with the ability to 
clearly define customer requirements and problem solve with suppliers, the safety control 
network.  
x
iii 
 
xiii 
This research uses a case study approach to assess the current situation and 
demonstrate an improvement approach to coordinate across organizational boundaries for 
improved quality in health care.  Using both qualitative and quantitative data, we observe 
empirically a relationship between unit coordination and quality, safety culture, and 
process improvement efforts.  This work provides a method for analyzing value streams 
that differ from the linear, sequential value stream mapping techniques commonly 
employed in manufacturing and introduces a coordination assessment measurement 
approach to quantify mismatches between technical flow and organizational structure.  
The ability of leadership to understand where breakdowns occur and develop 
countermeasures can impact the effectiveness of system-wide problem solving which, in 
turn, becomes the basis for continuous organizational learning and improvement.
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CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION 
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Today‘s healthcare is delivered as a system of highly specialized yet 
interconnected parts.  The large number of care givers and departments that are involved 
in providing timely, quality patient care increases the complexity in an already highly 
complex profession.  This complexity continues to grow as new specialties, services, 
tests, and treatments are developed.  In addition, the intrinsic variability in individual 
patient needs creates a vast network of potential interdependencies required for diagnosis, 
treatment, and health maintenance (Rouse, 2008).  While these interdependencies 
continue to emerge, a lack of coordination and communication between interdependent 
units has resulted in highly fragmented systems (Shortell, Gillies, Anderson, Erickson, & 
Mitchell, 1996).  This lack of communication between units has been identified as a 
leading source of preventable medical errors (The Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations, 2005; (Volpp & Grande, 2003).  Departmental silos and 
fragmentation in these complex, loosely coupled systems makes it increasingly difficult 
to effectively manage and improve patient outcomes (Fisher, Staiger, Bynum, & Gottlieb, 
2006; Wilensky, Wolter, & Fischer, 2007).   
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Organizational failures leading to safety issues have been an area of increased 
focus in healthcare.  The concept that preventable medical errors are often a result of 
poorly designed systems, rather than personal negligence, gained recognition in the mid-
nineties and continues to be emphasized in the literature (Bogner, 1994; Reason, 1997; 
Leape, Woods, Hatlie, Kizer, Schroeder, & Lundberg, 1998; Kohn, Corrigan, & 
Donaldson, 2000; Rasmussen, 2000; Reid, Compton, Grossman, & Fanjiang, 2005a; 
Leape, 2009).  While system breakdowns have been increasingly included in discussions 
of patient safety, there continues to be an underlying sense of fear that inhibits open and 
honest disclosure of medical errors.  Resistance to disclose errors may stem from fear for 
provider reputation, fear of job loss, legal liability, and most of all, the guilt associated 
with causing harm to a patient (Gallagher, Waterman, Ebers, Fraser, & Levinson, 2003).  
Upon deeper investigation, many of these errors are found to be a product of systems that 
fail to protect against erroneous actions and decisions by operators at the sharp end 
(Woods, Johannesen, Cook, & Sarter, 1994; Reason, 1997), yet barriers surrounding error 
disclosure make it difficult to openly learn from and improve upon these system 
vulnerabilities (Billings, 2000). 
Increasing complexity, interdependencies, fragmentation, and the potential for 
catastrophic outcomes create serious and persistent barriers to improving healthcare 
quality (Cebul, Rebitzer, Taylor, & Votruba, 2008).  Improved communication and 
coordination across organizational boundaries is necessary to improve outcomes in the 
complex, dynamic healthcare organization (Senge, 1994).  While lack of full error 
disclosure makes problem solving and continuous improvement difficult, it strengthens 
the case for proactive investigation into organizational weaknesses. 
3
 
 
 3  
Quality Improvement in Health Care 
Continuous quality improvement has been a topic of discussion in health care 
since the publication of landmark articles by Berwick, Laffel, and Blumenthal in the late 
eighties and the establishment of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement in 1991 
(Berwick, 1989; Laffel & Blumenthal, 1989).  While process improvement in healthcare 
gained momentum throughout the nineties, no medical error report has garnered as much 
attention as the Institute of Medicine‘s (IOM) To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health 
System (Kohn et al., 2000).  The report‘s most notable statistic is based on results from 
two retrospective Harvard Medical Practice studies of large samples of hospital 
admissions in New York, Colorado, and Utah.  When extrapolated to the over 33.6 
million admissions to U.S. hospitals in 1997, the results of the two Harvard studies 
suggest that between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die each year as a result of 
preventable medical errors.  Several articles disputed the report and argued that these 
estimates were exaggerated (Hughes, Honig, Phillips, Woodcock, Anderson, McDonald, 
Weiner, & Hui, 2000; Lebanon & Hanover, 2000; McDonald, Weiner, & Hui, 2000; Lee, 
2002), while others suggest numbers may be higher due to the fact that many errors go 
unrecorded (Leape, 2000).  Several studies followed the report to gauge the extent of 
preventable medical errors (Thomas, Studdert, Runciman, Webb, Sexton, Wilson, 
Gibberd, Harrison, & Brennan, 2000; Weingart, Wilson, Gibberd, & Harrison, 2000).  
One study that explored the underlying causes of preventable medical errors from 1994 to 
2004 suggests that latent organizational failures, particularly breakdowns in 
communication, played a large role in two-thirds of the adverse events (The Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, 2005). 
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After the release of the IOM report, the practical methodology of lean became 
popularized in healthcare as a method for improving quality, efficiency, and the 
continuity of care.  Lean management is built on the model of the Toyota Production 
System (TPS) which evolved in Toyota over a 60-year period and is intended to eliminate 
quality defects while reducing lead time and increasing efficiency.  TPS has its own 
embedded philosophy of error prevention, and hospitals have recently been working to 
adopt versions of lean for healthcare to increase efficiency and reduce errors.  As in 
manufacturing, healthcare organizations have had limited success with the lean 
management methodology.  Researchers have found considerable variation in 
organizations‘ abilities to implement lean (Liker, 2004) and have stressed the role that 
culture plays in problem solving throughout the organization.  Complex and fragmented 
systems have made problem solving throughout the high-risk, healthcare organization 
difficult.  
Fragmented Systems 
As process improvement efforts in healthcare increased, several articles were 
published marking the end of the beginning in the patient safety movement (Barach, 
2003; Altman, Clancy, & Blendon, 2004; Wachter, 2004; Bleich, 2005; Leape & 
Berwick, 2005).  These articles noted a failure to find significant reductions in medical 
error or system-wide changes.  The motivation for change after the IOM‘s report was 
stronger than ever, but process improvement efforts continued to be implemented in 
pieces, at local levels, thereby resulting in negligible improvements.  Fragmentation 
continues to impede the ability of the healthcare organizations to improve patient 
outcomes at a systems level (Cebul et al., 2008).  Therefore, to improve communication, 
5
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collaboration, and ultimately patient safety, several agencies and independent researchers 
have emphasized the need for collaboration across the healthcare system to reduce 
preventable medical errors (Kohn et al., 2000; Corrigan, Donaldson, Kohn, Maguire, & 
Pike, 2001; Leape, Berwick, & Bates, 2002).   
Following the call for a systems approach to error reduction, and little 
documented progress, organizational contributions to medical errors became a focal point 
for prominent researchers in both the operations management and human factors domains 
(Patterson, Cook, Woods, & Render, ; Cook, Render, & Woods, 2000; Patterson, Roth, 
Woods, Chow, & Gomes, 2004; Spear, 2005; Spear & Schmidhofer, 2005).  Spear 
describes these fragmented, error-prone systems as systems that tolerate ambiguity in 
processes and workarounds when issues arise, ―which creates many opportunities for 
ambiguity in terms of how an individual‘s work should be performed and how the work 
of many individuals should be successfully coordinated into an integrated whole‖ (Spear, 
2005).    He describes highly reliable systems as those that make clear exactly what is 
expected and what results should occur.  When results deviate from expectations, highly 
reliable systems promptly investigate the deviations to ensure they do not happen again 
(Spear & Schmidhofer, 2005).  Cook, Render, and Woods similarly identify the danger of 
gaps in healthcare delivery that result from complex and fragmented systems.  ―Gaps 
themselves mark the areas of vulnerability and show the mechanism by which complexity 
flows through health care to individual patients‖ (Cook et al., 2000).  They suggest the 
proactive identification of gaps in care to provide a usable picture of potential 
organizational weaknesses that may lead to future safety problems.  The reliable 
organization will proactively attempt to understand where these gaps exist, how they 
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emerge throughout the organization, and how they can effectively be managed in 
complex systems with many potential interdependencies.  These perspectives recognize 
the complexity inherent in healthcare and stress the importance of reducing fragmentation 
to establish a system that is capable of identifying dangerous deviations, and course 
correcting, to proactively avoid negative outcomes.   
Complexity, Communication, and Quality in Healthcare 
The healthcare system is complex, and success, in terms of improved quality, will 
be largely dependent on the organization‘s ability to coordinate both the social and 
technical factors across the entire value stream (healthcare delivery system).  A system 
can be defined as a collection of two or more interacting parts or an interdependent group 
forming a unified whole (Lyons & Walton, 2005).  A complex system is one in which 
there are so many interacting parts that it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict the 
behavior of the system based on a knowledge of its component parts (Runciman & 
Walton, 2007).  ―The health care system of the United States consists of various parts 
(e.g., clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, laboratories) that are interconnected (via flows of 
patients and information) to fulfill a purpose (e.g. maintaining and improving health)‖ 
(Plsek, 2001).  The continuum of a patient‘s care extends beyond the boundaries of any 
one entity within the health care system.  Beyond the inherent complexity of patient care, 
health care organizations are adaptive in nature.  Healthcare‘s ―parts‖ are comprised of 
highly skilled individuals that have been trained to adapt to and diagnose each patient‘s 
unique needs.  For this reason, the pieces of the healthcare organization give rise to very 
complex global behavior.  The system becomes, on the whole, greater than the sum of its 
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parts (Laughlin, Curie, & are out while Jurassic, 2005).    These emergent system 
properties can manifest as either innovation or error (Plsek, 2001).   
In addition to being a complex adaptive system, the healthcare organization is a 
socio-technical system.  Much like the emergent properties of complex systems, the 
interaction between the technical and human aspects of patient care are greater than either 
aspect considered alone (Trist, 1981).  As medical technology advances, thereby 
increasing the complexity of processes, the socio-technical paradigm offers an 
organizational model which regards man a resource to be developed to troubleshoot a 
changing environment.  ―Thus, the study of modern complex systems requires an 
understanding of the interactions and interrelationships between the technical, human, 
social, and organizational aspects of systems‖ (Qureshi, 2007). 
Thompson‘s work (1967) contributed to this theory by classifying the different 
types of organizational interdependence.  He classified these differences based on the 
type of technology employed, the level of interdependence among the tasks performed, 
the degree of power/dependence between the organization and competitors, the stability 
of the environment, and the extent of ambiguity in standards employed to evaluate 
organizational performance (Thompson, 2003).  The hospital, under Thompson‘s 
interdependence classifications, should have a reciprocal form of interdependence, strong 
horizontal communication channels, and coordination requiring mutual adjustment and 
cross-departmental meetings.    
The product of healthcare, like many service industries, can be both tangible and 
intangible.  It can be in the form of a patient, lab work, and/or information that leads to a 
correct diagnosis.  The processes required to transform these products into quality patient 
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care often requires coordination and communication between specialized and somewhat 
autonomous departments.  Each department or process is dependent on another, yet the 
medical culture often emphasizes autonomy and working within professional and 
organizational boundaries.  Karou Ishikawa was the first to formally state that the next 
process is the customer within the quality literature (Ishikawa, 1985).  This concept of 
internal customers is one that is critical to providing quality patient care in highly 
complex, specialized, and fragmented healthcare systems.  While Ishikawa is credited 
with the quality contribution of identifying and communicating with internal customers to 
improve quality, this concept is inherent in Toyota‘s processes.  Rule two in Steven 
Spear‘s thesis Rules-In-Use as a Codification of TPS (1999) suggests that part of 
Toyota‘s success stems from its ability to align information flows with workflow.  When 
coordinating workflows and social interactions in the socio-technical system, customers 
and suppliers (both internal and external) should be connected through clearly defined, 
overlapping request/response channels.  Aligning both the product and information 
streams has implications for architectural simplification, information clarity, and problem 
identification (Spear, 1999).  This type of alignment should reduce the risk of the supplier 
receiving multiple, possibly conflicting requests, which ultimately reduces errors 
throughout the entire delivery process. 
While the customer/supplier dynamic offers valuable insights to effective 
coordination and improved outcomes, a fundamental barrier to improvement efforts in 
healthcare lies in indentifying the customer.  Is it the patient or the next process?  
Complex, adaptive socio-technical systems with highly specialized and autonomous 
departments have made coordination throughout the system difficult.  Fragmented 
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systems and discontinuity in the healthcare delivery process continues to prevent 
healthcare organizations from achieving the resiliency, reliability, and safety they desire.  
Additional research is necessary to better understand where these gaps exist, how they 
emerge throughout the organization, and how they can effectively be managed to 
improve patient safety.   
   
RESEARCH STATEMENT 
 
The objective of this research is to provide a methodology for analyzing and 
improving safety from a systems perspective.  This work will synthesize research on 
complex systems, organizational reliability, and lean management.  A network approach 
will be used to evaluate how closely employees‘ knowledge of upstream problem 
resolution and downstream requirements aligns with technical flow.  The goal is to create 
a model which reduces ambiguity by aligning the technical flow of patients and lab work 
with clearly defined request and response channels between internal customers and 
suppliers.   
Organization of Document 
Since the intent is a proven practical methodology, the research approach will 
combine theory and practice through actual case studies of implementation.  This work 
will uncover insights about the prevalence of discontinuities in the healthcare delivery 
system and will establish a model for achieving safety at a system level.  A review of the 
literature surrounding complexity and error in healthcare will be presented in Chapter II 
to provide context and support for this work in addition to pertinent organizational 
1
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theories on patient safety.  Chapter II will build upon these theories to propose a 
methodology for proactive and continuous identification of organizational weaknesses 
between departments which we refer to as gaps in cross-unit coordination.  These gaps 
between departments, when identified and continuously improved upon, should 
theoretically enhance problem solving, reduce errors, and improve patient safety across 
the system.  This work will aim to answer our first research question:  How can complex 
systems tie patient safety efforts across interdependent, yet semiautonomous, units to 
enable system-wide improvement?    
    The network alignment approach presented in Chapter II examines the alignment 
of patient or diagnostic information flow, the technical flow network, with the ability to 
clearly define customer requirements and problem solve with suppliers, the safety control 
network.  The model, in conjunction with the case studies presented in chapters III and 
IV, strengthens the argument for coordination across organizational boundaries to 
improve patient safety in healthcare.  The case studies present two very different clinical 
contexts, where similar organizational weaknesses have the ability to compromise patient 
safety.  Each case will review the unique clinical setting and use variations of the 
proposed model to analyze and understand the organizational factors required for system-
wide improvement.  While a number of factors will be examined, both cases will focus 
on the ability of the system to coordinate and problem solve across organizational 
boundaries.  Chapter III will utilize an embedded, single-case study design to 
demonstrate how a variety of organizational factors impact safety culture, and in turn 
how that safety culture impacts quality within one Anatomic Pathology (AP) department.  
Additionally, this study will investigate the role of problem solving across organizational 
1
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boundaries for system-wide process improvement.  This case will present a quantitative 
application of the model described in Chapter II and will aim to answer the second 
research question:  How can practitioners utilize the network alignment approach for 
cross-unit gap identification and how do these gaps impact safety culture and quality? 
Chapter IV will expand upon the model to examine patient flow of Intensive Care 
Unit (ICU) patients throughout a large community hospital.  This case will present an 
organic, team-driven approach to system-wide process improvement and will address the 
third and final research question:  How does the approach to system-wide improvement 
impact problem solving and process improvement across the interdependent, yet 
semiautonomous departments within a complex system?    
  This work will uncover insights about the prevalence of discontinuities in the 
healthcare delivery system, the importance of problem solving across organizational 
boundaries, and the role of leadership in establishing a model for system-wide 
improvement.   
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CHAPTER II:  MANAGING THE COMPLEX, NON-LINEAR VALUE STREAM 
FOR IMPROVED PATIENT SAFETY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The healthcare industry in the United States is faced with the challenge of 
increased demand for healthcare services, fewer hospitals as a result of consolidation into 
integrated delivery systems, ever-changing medical and technological advancements, and 
diminishing reimbursements.  External factors are placing more pressure on healthcare 
organizations to provide both effective and efficient patient care.  Internally, a growing 
array of specialty and diagnostic services are creating increasingly complex systems. 
Variability in individual patient needs and severity spawn complex webs of 
interdependent agents that must be able to coordinate care, adapt to the environment, and 
collectively improve to provide the best possible care.    
While healthcare has unique challenges, coordinating and improving the complex 
system is a challenge faced by many industries.  These types of systems are commonly 
referred to as complex, adaptive systems (Holland, 1992).  Miller and Page (Miller & 
Page, 2007) define the complex adaptive system as a collection of adaptive, diverse, 
connected entities with interdependent actions.  Complexity science, or the study of 
complex systems, is a broad, interdisciplinary research area that studies emergent system 
behaviors in diverse applications such as computer science, biology, economics, 
1
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organizational theory, and physics.  Emergence is a key concept in this field and has been 
used as early as 322 BC by Aristotle to describe higher order system behavior that is not 
reducible to the sum of its parts.   
Holland (1992) defines the complex, adaptive system as ―a dynamic network of 
many agents (which may represent cells, species, individuals, firms, nations) acting in 
parallel, constantly acting and reacting to what the other agents are doing.  If there is to 
be any coherent behavior in the system, it has to arise from competition and cooperation 
among the agents themselves.  The overall [emergent] behavior of the system is the result 
of a huge number of decisions made every moment by many individual agents.‖  In 
addition to emergence, another characteristic of the complex, adaptive system found in 
several definitions is that interactions between agents are often non-linear (Dooley, 
1997).  The presence of multiple and changing connections between agents create 
complicated, interdependent networks.  It is in this respect that healthcare is aptly 
described as a complex, adaptive system (Begun, Dooley, & Zimmerman, 2003).  The 
healthcare delivery process can vary greatly for each patient.  As disease and illness are 
diagnosed and treated, the path for providing service to the patient can deviate from 
initial expectations, requiring ad hoc coordination between a large number of providers 
and departments.  The healthcare delivery process can easily diverge from a linear, 
sequential path as a patient‘s health changes and as clinical information is gathered.   
Overly complex processes can have implications for both operational efficiency 
and patient safety.  Over the past decade, several researchers have investigated the ways 
in which complexity, and associated variability and ambiguity, impact one of the 
fundamental principles of medicine, ‗first, do no harm.‘  Preventable medical errors, as a 
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result of increasingly complex and strained healthcare systems, have become a focus of 
academic research, popular media, and governmental agencies.  During this time, the 
concepts of lean manufacturing gained attention in healthcare as an organizational 
approach to improve processes and reduce waste in an attempt to provide timely, quality 
care in an increasingly complex environment.   
Lean production, based on the Toyota Production System (TPS) has been 
benchmarked worldwide for the production efficiencies it creates through empowering 
workers to eliminate wasted time, material, and other resources – all towards the goal of 
reducing lead time from customer order to product [or service] delivery (Liker, 2004). 
Lean has been adopted in many complex applications and industries including research 
and development, product development, aerospace, supply chain management, and 
government.  The focus on shortening lead time through the elimination of waste, in any 
setting, allows problems to surface.  As problems are exposed, they are systematically 
addressed by employees through structured problem solving.  
While there are many examples of successful process improvements, real and 
lasting lean implementation has been less noticeable.  Many organizations fail to 
differentiate between the lean toolset and the way an organization approaches waste, 
problem solving, and people development (Womack, Jones, & Roos, 1991; Spear & 
Bowen, 1999; Liker, 2004).  While system-wide transformations require a different way 
of thinking, many healthcare organizations hit barriers that make even small-scale 
improvements challenging.  Process improvement becomes increasingly difficult as 
patient care is coordinated across organizational boundaries.  Silos, ambiguity, and 
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incomplete knowledge of the system make coordination, and thus process improvement 
efforts, between departments difficult.   
Healthcare delivery systems have many potential interdependent connections that 
need to mutually adjust to provide timely and quality patient care.  A number of 
semiautonomous entities must interact with one another to provide the right care at the 
right time.  Depending on the individual and their unique situation, a patient may require 
the following: intensive care, emergency services, diagnostic images, laboratory tests, 
specialist consultations, home care, and many other services.  All of these entities are 
loosely coupled in an intricate network of individuals and teams of people, procedures, 
regulations, communications, equipment, and devices that function in a variable and 
uncertain environment with diffused, decentralized management control (Van Cott, 
1994).  While all of these connections have the potential for mutual adjustment, some fall 
victim to turf battles and mistrust that result in loss of collaboration.   Like many complex 
systems, the health system‘s service components –  a particular medical floor, the 
emergency department, radiology, laboratory services, perioperative services, or an 
outpatient clinic – each have a distinct culture with unique goals, values, beliefs, and 
norms of behavior (Van Cott, 1994).  Each area is managed separately but is dependent 
upon several other departments and individuals to provide care to each patient. 
The increasingly complex healthcare system makes improving patient safety 
across the fragmented service components difficult.  This research will present a novel 
approach to process improvement in the complex system which emphasizes coordination 
between semiautonomous units in a way that improves problem solving and ultimately 
patient safety.  Since this work strives to establish a systems approach to error reduction 
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and safety in highly complex and risky environments, we focus on the role of horizontal, 
cross-unit communication between interdependent entities and incorporate aspects of 
expertise and authority when appropriate.  It is at these organizational boundaries that 
broad-based patient safety in the complex, adaptive system becomes difficult. 
A Systemic Approach to Patient Safety 
The medical industry is trying to move away from a culture of blame in 
improving patient safety and establish a new culture of understanding adverse events as a 
result of system inadequacies (Kohn et al., 2000).  This shift in thinking brings many 
previously hidden issues to the forefront for investigation since the blame does not lie 
solely on the individual.   Errors that bridge connections such as nurse to physician, 
patient to physician, radiology to the Emergency Department (ED), ED nurse to floor 
nurse, OR to pathology… are now often labeled as system errors.  Even errors that occur 
with a single individual can often be attributed to inadequate protocol or training, 
workplace design, or communication.  These are system errors in that sense that the 
system, in which the individual or entities interacted, did not protect against the often 
unpredictable and inevitable failure.  But stopping the understanding of the error at that 
point is just as ineffective as concluding a root cause analysis with an ‗operator error‘ 
verdict.  In order to create reliable and resilient complex systems, we need to understand 
how system features fail to prevent against front-line operator error, or failure at the 
sharp-end. 
When serious system failures occur, they are a result of multiple, and apparently 
harmless, faults that occur together (Perrow, 1984; Reason, 1990; Turner & Pidgeon, 
1997).  In complex systems, these apparently small faults happen regularly and rarely 
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result in serious adverse outcomes.  For the most part, the minor faults are inactive, play 
no role in system operation, and are therefore described as latent failures (Reason, 1990).  
These types of failures, especially in complex, high-risk environments, tend to be 
extremely complex in nature and are therefore difficult to categorize.  This may explain 
the new tendency to broadly define certain events as system errors, since the explanation 
is likely to be extremely nuanced.  In organizations and industries where latent failures 
are more common, systems are so complex and are operated under such variable 
conditions that only human operators can be expected to have both the flexibility and 
judgment necessary to control them (Cook & Woods, 1994).   
In order to better understand how these complex failures emerge, we must first 
define error.  Reason defines error as circumstances in which planned actions fail to 
achieve the desired outcome (Reason, 2000). Therefore if the action taken was not the 
one that was or should have been intended, there has been an error (Senders & Moray, 
1991).  This definition does not suggest or imply there was an adverse event.  Adverse 
events may happen without an error and errors may occur with no negative outcome.  
According to Senders, an accident is an unplanned, unexpected, and undesired event, 
usually with an adverse consequence.  An adverse outcome after an error, by this 
definition, is an accident (Senders & Moray, 1991).  The literature often uses the word 
error to represent accidents.  What results is a large number of taxonomies and statistics 
regarding accidents with little understanding about the errors that occurred.   
The Harvard Medical Practice Study, made popular in the 1999 Institute of 
Medicine report To Err is Human (Kohn et al., 2000), found that nearly 4% of patients 
hospitalized in New York in 1984 suffered an adverse event, defined as an unintended 
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injury caused by treatment that resulted in prolongation of hospital stay or measureable 
disability at the time of discharge (Leape, Brennan, Laird, Lawthers, Localio, Barnes, 
Hebert, Newhouse, Weiler, & Hiatt, 1991).  Two years later, another study was 
performed using these records to determine which injuries may have been preventable.  
The records were reviewed, and each adverse event was classified as preventable, 
unpreventable, or potentially preventable by physician reviewers.  An adverse event was 
classified as preventable if it resulted from an error (Leape, Lawthers, Brennan, & 
Johnson, 1993).  From this study, more than two-thirds (70%) of adverse events were 
found to be preventable, 24% were judged unpreventable, and the remaining 6% were 
classified as potentially preventable.  The errors contributing to the adverse events were 
grouped into the following four categories: 
 Diagnostic –  Error in diagnosis or delay in diagnosis; Failure to employ 
indicated tests; Use of outmoded tests or therapy; Failure to act on the results 
of monitoring or testing 
 Treatment –  Technical error in the performance of an operation, procedure, or 
test; Error in administering the treatment (including preparation for treatment 
or operation); Error in the dose of a drug or in the method of use of a drug; 
Avoidable delay in treatment or in responding to an abnormal test; 
Inappropriate (not indicated) care 
 Preventive –  Failure to provide indicated prophylactic treatment; Inadequate 
monitoring or follow-up of treatment 
 Other –  Failure in communication; Equipment failure; Other system failure 
 
More recently than the Harvard Medical Practice Study (citation), HealthGrades‘ 
analysis of 41 million Medicare patient records suggested that patient safety incidents 
cost the federal Medicare program $8.8 billion and resulted in 238,337 potentially 
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preventable deaths from 2004 through 2006 (Health Grades, 2008).  This is an 
improvement upon their 2004 study that estimated that approximately 304,702 
Americans die each year due to preventable errors (Health Grades, 2004).  The U.S. 
Department of Health study suggests that 32,500 patients die as a result of preventable 
medical errors in U.S. hospitals each year (Zhan & Miller, 2003).  The researchers in this 
study stated that their numbers were much lower than other estimates because their 
methodology only covered selected types of medical injury that were discovered during 
hospitalization.  According to the Centers for Disease Control, nearly two million patients 
suffer from a hospital acquired infection each year, resulting in 99,000 deaths (Scott, 
2009). 
Estimates regarding the extent of medical error and adverse events vary widely as 
methodologies, interpretations, and datasets differ.  In addition to nationwide estimates of 
preventable errors and adverse events, taxonomies of error can be found by service and 
specialty including but not limited to laboratory services, medicine, surgery, orthopedics, 
pediatrics, obstetrics, urology, radiology, intensive care, emergency services, and primary 
care offices.  Many of these studies classify adverse events based on the type of error.  
Unfortunately, these classifications tend to be vague as previously noted.  ‗Error in 
diagnosis‘ does not provide the granularity needed to truly understand each error and, 
consequently, how to improve.  A focus on broad classifications, and not all the 
contributing factors unique to each event, may lead administrators and care givers to 
employ incomplete or inappropriate safeguards that add unnecessary complexity to the 
system.   These adverse event estimates and broad classifications only raise awareness of 
the need to improve problem solving and collaboration between system components.   
2
0
 
 
 20  
If we attempt to understand these errors and events as systems failures, a more 
contextual and nuanced explanation is necessary.  The healthcare delivery process 
requires the coordination of many caregivers, services, equipment, and technology.  In a 
simple production series, system reliability is a function of each component‘s reliability 
and its position in the series.  The simple, linear series can improve overall reliability 
when the least reliable component is improved or removed.  In complex, adaptive 
systems, improving reliability is not as simple.   
The systemic view of patient safety suggests that adverse events result from a 
combination of several seemingly small, latent errors.  Thus reliability in the complex 
system is considered to be a dynamic nonevent (Weick, 2001).  ―It is dynamic because 
safety is preserved by timely human adjustments; it is a nonevent because successful 
outcomes rarely call attention to themselves‖ (Reason, 2000).  What makes some 
complex, adaptive systems more successful than others is the ability to coordinate 
between agents or entities to catch small errors and problem solve before they propagate 
into larger adverse events.  This is where cross-unit coordination between internal 
customers and suppliers becomes critical to identifying small deviations and problem 
solving to prevent more serious adverse events.  No one person or department has a 
complete picture of the system or even the care plan for one patient.  Individual 
perspectives and abilities of doctors, nurses, technicians, aids, and pharmacists enable a 
system of checks and balances that can adapt to change and create a more flexible, 
resilient system.   These individuals and departments are the nodes that link the 
components of healthcare; they are critical to its reliability and safety (Van Cott, 1994).  
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This people-centered aspect of healthcare can provide a buffer against unpredictable 
latent system errors.   
In order to harness the potential reliability capable within a complex system, the 
components must be able to function in a coordinated manner to identify deviations and 
problem solve when necessary.  The healthcare system, though, tends to be largely 
fragmented making coordination and system reliability difficult.  Instead of coordinating 
to improve safety throughout the continuum of care, individual units focus primarily on 
improving their unit performance with little regard for the impact on others (Reid, 
Compton, Grossman, & Fanjiang, 2005b).  Therefore, coordination between internal 
customers and suppliers becomes critical for system-wide improvement and reliability.   
The Internal Customer-Supplier Relationship 
Joeseph Juran, Edwards Deming, and Karou Ishikawa were pioneers in the 
industrial quality movement.  Juran defined quality as ―fitness for use‖ (Juran, 1988) by 
the customer while Deming stated that quality ―should be aimed at the needs of the 
customer, present and future‖ (Deming, 1992).  In both definitions, the customer 
determines the quality of a product or service.  In healthcare, the patient is the customer.  
The health system exists to provide a service to its patients.  Following with the above 
definitions, quality is determined by the patient.   
Since health systems provide such a vast array of services by many different 
caregivers, the health service is provided by many individuals throughout the course of a 
patient‘s care.  This can include services provided during registration, admission, testing, 
treatment, discharge, home care, rehabilitation, or follow-up appointments.  Each aspect 
in the continuum of care can impact the others as patient information and care plans are 
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shared between functions.  Thus, the overall quality of the service is based upon the 
entire care-delivery process.  This is also true in other complex systems when a product 
or service is provided by the coordination of several individuals, departments, or 
organizations.  It is with this understanding of interdependence that Ishikawa emphasized 
the role of internal customer and suppliers in quality improvement and coined the term 
―the next process is your customer‖ (Ishikawa & Lu, 1985).   
While the notion of internal and external customers and suppliers has existed for 
decades, terms like fragmentation or silos are more common when describing 
relationships between service components within healthcare (Shortell et al., 1996; Cebul 
et al., 2008; Stange, 2009).  Additionally, ―critical tasks in the financing and provision of 
health care are distributed across a variety of distinct, often competing, entities each with 
its own objectives, obligations, and capabilities‖ (Cebul et al., 2008).  Many departments 
function as semiautonomous units with their own unique capabilities and culture that can 
impact employee satisfaction, safety, and patient satisfaction (Moody & Pesut, 2006).  
While departments may differ widely in incentives, capabilities, and staffing, they often 
are required to coordinate with one another throughout a patient‘s continuum of care.   
There are varying perspectives on the most appropriate way to coordinate tasks 
between units in the complex, adaptive system.  Thompson‘s early work (Thompson, 
1967) identifies three basic structures for interdependence: pooled, sequential, and 
reciprocal.  The complex, adaptive system (i.e. hospitals or new product development) is 
considered to have reciprocal forms of interdependence as outputs of each task or 
department provide inputs to the other.   ―Hospitals are an excellent example because 
they provide coordinated services to patients.   A patient may move back and forth 
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between x-ray, surgery, and physical therapy as needed‖ (Daft, 2004).  Management 
requirements of reciprocal interdependence are greatest since coordination and mutual 
adjustment between departments requires high levels of information processing activities 
such as decision making and communication (Galbraith, 1974; Tushman & Nadler, 
1978). 
Many early theorists suggest that organizations with reciprocal interdependence 
require horizontal structures with departments that are collocated or that report to the 
same person on the organizational chart as a way to reduce information processing 
requirements (Daft, 2004).  Additionally, cross-departmental teams working on shared 
processes can provide the coordination necessary to support reciprocal interdependence.  
While Daft suggests that poor coordination in these settings results in poor organizational 
performance, not all organizational theorists share this view.  There are competing 
theories on the degree to which cross-departmental coordination either enables or limits 
an organization‘s ability to problem solve, learn, and adjust in the high-risk, complex 
organization. 
Theories on Coordination and Resilience 
Unlike organizations that exhibit strong central control, healthcare organizations 
are often divided into semiautonomous units that specialize in a particular aspect of 
patient care (Hasenfeld, 1993).  Work unit autonomy gives control to the unit managers 
who are familiar with the operational demand of providing care within the unit‘s mandate 
(Pinelle & Gutwin, 2006) which results in loose coupling between units.  Perrow 
(Perrow, 1984) introduced interactive complexity and loose/tight coupling to determine a 
system‘s potential for accidents.  He defines interactive complexity as the presence of 
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unfamiliar or unexpected sequences of events that are either not visible or immediately 
comprehensible.  A tightly coupled system is one that is highly interdependent.  Perrow 
suggested that systems that are highly interdependent are more likely to behave in 
unpredictable ways and stressed that systems with high ‗interactive complexity‘ and tight 
coupling inevitably result in failure.  Weick similarly suggests that loose coupling can be 
an effective solution to environmental change and limited information-processing 
capabilities (Weick, 2001).  He likens loose coupling in social systems to 
compartmentalization in individuals ―a means to achieve cognitive economy and a little 
peace‖ (Weick, 1982).  
On the other side of the spectrum, Sabel and Zeitlin (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2004) argue 
that loose coupling reduces the ability of organizations to coordinate, innovate, and learn.  
Similarly, tight coupling in complex systems has been found to be beneficial as a way to 
manage complexity and improve reliability (Grandori & Soda, 1995; Helper, MacDuffie, 
& Sabel, 2000; Gittell, 2002; Gittell & Weiss, 2004).  According to relational theories of 
coordination forwarded by Gittel, communication and relationship ties provide a 
powerful source of information processing capacity or bandwidth for coordinating work 
(Crowston & Kammerer, 1998; Faraj & Xiao, 2006).  ―By extension, work processes that 
are either highly interdependent or highly complex require relatively strong 
communication and relationship ties for their successful coordination.  Conversely, work 
processes with low levels of task interdependence or complexity can be successfully 
coordinated through weak communication and relationship ties‖ (Gittell, Weinberg, 
Pfefferle, & Bishop, 2008).   
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Simon (Simon, 1973) argues a more moderate perspective stating that ―loose 
horizontal coupling permits each subassembly to operate dynamically in independence of 
the detail of others; only the inputs it requires and the outputs it produces are relevant for 
the larger aspects of system behavior.‖  Eisenhardt and Brown (Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1998) added that to reduce information overload, organizations must be comprised of 
individual units that are only partly connected to one another, while simultaneously 
ensuring that there is not too little coordination.  Other theorists also suggest that the most 
effective complex systems exist ―at the edge of chaos,‖ in a state that is balanced between 
too much and too little coordination (Carroll & Burton, 2000).   
Healthcare organizations have historically been loosely coupled due to the high 
degree of specialization and inherent complexity in providing individualized care for 
each patient.  While these units are largely semiautonomous, they are still dependent on 
one another to provide patient care.  In fact, they are traditionally characterized as having 
reciprocal interdependence, which denotes the strongest level of interdependence 
(Thompson, 1967).  Therefore, the units within the complex healthcare organization face 
the challenge of balancing the appropriate organizational structure with process or 
technical interdependence. While loose coupling enables each unit to adapt to 
environmental change, it also makes system-wide improvements difficult.   
Loose coupling between departments offers particular advantages in complex 
environments including increased specialization, differentiation, and contextual decision-
making.  Additionally, loose coupling protects the total system from breakdowns at its 
elements.   Tight coupling between departments maximizes coordination and 
communication between elements that can reduce the bounded rationality common within 
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complex systems and can improve the ability to tie process improvements across the 
system.  While each perspective has advantages, they both have disadvantages as well.  
Loose coupling can reduce the ability to mutually adjust in systems of reciprocal 
interdependence while the information processing requirements of tightly coupled 
systems can reduce responsiveness and flexibility between units.  The challenge for 
healthcare organizations and other complex systems lies in finding a balance in cross-unit 
coordination and communication that enables both problem identification and problem 
solving.  This leads us to our primary research question:  How can complex systems tie 
error reduction efforts across interdependent, yet semiautonomous, units to enable 
system-wide improvement?    
 
APPROACHES TO COMPLEXITY AND PROCESS IMPROVEMENT 
 
Practitioners have been drawn to two popular management approaches, high 
reliability organization (HRO) theory and lean management, to improve performance in 
the complex system.  Both approaches have recently become popularized in healthcare as 
a way to reduce error and the potential for failure.  While the aspects of HROs and lean 
are complimentary, each approach has a slightly different perspective on the extent to 
which cross-unit communication is coordinated.    
High Reliability and Requisite Variety 
High reliability organizations (HROs) are organizations that are able to avoid 
catastrophe in high consequence environments where normal accidents (Perrow, 1984) 
can be expected due to tight coupling and interactive complexity.  Following Perrow‘s 
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analysis of the Three Mile Island disaster and several other investigations into accidents 
and near misses in high risk industries, many researchers began to investigate the role of 
coupling and complexity on major organizational failures.  Research on these 
organizations has not led to specific methodologies that can be used by practitioners for 
actionable improvement.  Instead, analysis of high reliability organizations has led to 
insights and concepts that are meant to change the way administration, practitioners, and 
researchers understand and respond to error in high-risk systems.   
While the various researchers in the high reliability domain each present their 
own slightly different model for how to achieve reliability and resilience, healthcare 
literature has largely focused on the work of Karl Weick.  Weick suggests that 
organizations in complex and high risk settings can achieve mindfulness and reliability 
by following five core concepts: sensitivity to operations, reluctance to simplify, 
preoccupation with failure, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise (2007).  
Sensitivity to operations requires attentiveness to the systems and processes that create 
the product or service.  Sensitivity to these processes allows those closest to the work to 
make adjustments that prevent small errors from manifesting into catastrophic accidents.  
High reliability organizations also resist using simplistic explanations for why processes 
work or why they don‘t.  This increased granularity allows for deeper understanding and 
mindfulness.  When processes don‘t work as expected, these organizations have a 
preoccupation with failure that views near misses as a sign that something needs 
attention, not that safeguards prevented a potential accident.  When accidents do occur, 
these organizations commit to resilience by improvising to keep the system functioning.  
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Finally, deference to expertise moves the decisions on how to respond to failures to those 
on the front line who understand the processes best.   
Together, these concepts provide the complex organization with the ability to 
achieve mindfulness, and thus high reliability, in a high risk environment.  Weick defines 
mindfulness as ―a rich awareness of discriminatory detail.‖  The mindful organization 
will respond to weak signals or small, early indicators of potentially large system failures 
by improvising short-term workarounds to keep errors small and the system functioning.  
Workarounds are a non-standard response or countermeasure to managing a complex or 
unforeseen situation.  While workarounds without subsequent problem solving can be 
dangerous, Weick presents workarounds as an adaptive response to early signals of 
failure.   
A certain amount of ambiguity and variety allows the organization to discover 
adaptive responses, such as workarounds, it would have otherwise not have discovered.  
Yet ambiguity can also be the source of error itself.  In this respect, Weick suggests that 
there is a requisite amount of variety that complex organizations must maintain to 
respond to disruptions with the appropriate degree of sensitivity.  The law of requisite 
variety (Ashby, 1958) states that the larger the variety of actions able to control a system, 
the larger the variety of perturbations it is able to manage.  This is essentially the way that 
the loosely coupled yet interdependent units within a healthcare organization maintain the 
flexibility to respond to individual patient needs each day.  The semiautonomous units 
coordinate on an ad hoc basis when patient care or information is passed from one unit to 
another.  While loose coupling and a wide range of potential interdependencies enable 
greater flexibility, it has made coordinated system-wide error reduction and process 
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improvement extremely difficult.  Understanding how to effectively match the variety of 
technical dependencies with the appropriate amount of coordination becomes critical to 
error reduction across the loosely coupled, interdependent system.  The challenge in these 
systems lies in striking a balance between excessive complexity and oversimplification 
that enables both flexibility and coordinated problem solving.   
While the social coordination and technical dependencies of an organization can 
be sequential (linear), as complexity increases, these interactions can quickly become 
reciprocal (non-linear).  Morgan uses the metaphor of organizations as organisms 
(Morgan, 2006) to describe how social and technical needs must evolve together for the 
organization to successfully adapt to the ever-changing environment.  Optimization of 
each aspect alone (social or technical) tends to increase not only the quantity of 
unpredictable, ‗un-designed‘ relationships but also those relationships that are injurious 
to the system‘s performance (Jenkins, Stanton, Walker, Salmon, & Young, 2006).   
At Toyota, the product value stream and the people value stream are intertwined 
in a system that makes up the DNA of the Toyota Way (Liker & Hoseus, 2008).  Spear 
suggests that what makes Toyota so successful is their ability to couple the process of 
doing work with the process of learning to do it better as it‘s being done (Spear, 2005).  
These aspects of Toyota‘s socio-technical system are what set them apart from the 
competition in terms of efficiency and quality.  As technical and safety requirements are 
coordinated horizontally, problems are addressed, and the system as a whole becomes 
more reliable.   
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Lean and the ‘Rules-in-Use’ 
Many people have acknowledged that the Toyota management system, or lean, 
has enabled the company to achieve world class quality and efficiency, but few have been 
able to successfully emulate their practices.  Many articles and books describe the tools 
commonly found within the Toyota production system.  These tools alone, though, do not 
address the culture of structured problem solving that enables the organization to 
continuously learn and improve.  This type of learning cannot be imitated since it is, as 
Weick suggested, context specific (Spear, 1999). 
Spear (1999) outlines five ―rules-in-use‖ that have enabled Toyota to achieve both 
world class efficiency and quality.  In his observations of Toyota, he explains that these 
design guidelines ―existed in the design, performance, and improvement of individual 
activities and in the design, operation, and improvement of system activities.  The 
patterns were so strong, it appeared as if people were using rules to guide their decision 
making even though the rules themselves were never actually articulated‖ (Spear, 1999).  
These rules-in-use that define the essence of the Toyota production system are as follows: 
 Rule 1 – Design and perform every activity so that it is structured and self-
diagnostic.  
 Rule 2 – Design and operate the connection between every person who or 
every machine that supplies a good, service, or information and the customer 
who receives the specific item so that the connection is direct, binary, and 
self-diagnostic.   
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 Rule 3 – Each good, service, and piece of information must have a simple, 
pre-specified, self diagnostic flow-path over which it will travel as it takes 
form.   
 Rule 4 – Design and do all improvement activities so that they are 
experiments – structured, self-diagnostic (hypothesis-testing) activities.  
 Rule 5 – Resolve connection and flow-path problems that affect a customer-
supplier pair in the smallest group that includes the affected individuals.   
These rules-in-use represent the ideal state which offers guidelines for behavior.  
While Spear notes that the rules are rarely followed exactly, they provide an implicit goal 
towards which to strive.  It is through these design guides that the organization can 
identify deviations and problem solve to keep errors small.  These rules complement 
Weick‘s work on High Reliability Organizations (HROs) by adding clear design 
guidelines, particularly Rule 3, for systems composed of modular and interdependent 
entities.  In this rule, Spear states three key characteristics of effective customer/supplier 
flow paths: pre-specified, simple, and self-diagnostic.  Spear defines these characteristics 
as follows: Pre-specified flow paths require each product, service, or information to have 
one and only one flow path throughout the value stream, or series of processes and 
activities required to create or deliver a product or service.  Simple flow paths must not 
have loops or intertwined branches.  A self-diagnostic flow path is one that generates a 
binary signal when the good, service, or information deviates from the expected path.  
Integrating the Two Perspectives 
While the aspects of high reliability organizations and Toyota‘s ‗rules in use‘ can 
help guide organizations to identify and respond to errors, and problem solve to 
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continuously improve the system, they vary in their degree to which variety and/or 
complexity is accepted.  The healthcare organization is an example of a complex, 
adaptive system that has multiple potential flow paths that are dependent on each 
patient‘s individual needs.  The manufacturing parallel to healthcare‘s complexity would 
be a job shop where each individual part requires a unique machine sequence.  It is hard 
to argue that the healthcare organization, or the job shop, should simplify operations to 
the extent that all flow paths are pre-specified, simple, and self-diagnostic.  Instead, 
incorporating the requisite variety necessary for each organization with these ideal goals 
in mind can help the complex organization be mindful and problem solve when 
necessary.  Incorporating these concepts and guidelines from high reliability theory and 
lean, as shown in Figure 1, provides an opportunity for organizations to reduce errors 
throughout the complex, non-linear value stream.   
 
Figure 1: Coordination Continuum 
 
By incorporating aspects from both ideals, the complex organization can focus on 
coordination between various internal customers and suppliers that most adequately 
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meets the needs of each organization.  The integration of these two approaches follows 
with the moderate coupling perspective forwarded by Simon (Simon, 1973) and Brown 
and Eisenhardt (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998).  In order to determine both requisite variety 
and the clarity of flow-paths, each organization must first understand its value stream, 
regardless of complexity.   
 
EXTENDING THE VALUE STREAM MAP TO THE COMPLEX, NON-LINEAR 
SYSTEM 
 
The value stream can be defined as the sequence of actions required to design, 
produce, or provide a product or service to the customer.  Mapping the value stream is a 
process that has been used for decades within Toyota to depict current and future or 
―ideal‖ states in the process of continuous improvement.  When mapping the value 
stream, practitioners move away from optimization of component parts and are better 
equipped to improve whole system functioning.  At Toyota, the term ―Material and 
Information Flow Mapping‖ (Rother & Shook, 2003) is commonly used to describe what 
lean practitioners now call ―Value Stream Mapping‖ since both material and information 
paths are critical to providing the right product or service, in the right amount, at the right 
time.   
The value stream map is useful at many levels within and across organizations.  
The value stream can vary greatly in scope and, in healthcare, can range from a single 
outpatient visit to long-term care which is coordinated across multiple care givers and 
organizations.  In order to identify the appropriate scope, Rother and Shook suggest that 
3
4
 
 
 34  
one of the first steps in the mapping process requires selecting a product family.  A 
product family is a group of products or services that pass through a series of similar 
processes.  The concept of product families can be readily translated to service lines such 
as orthopedics, emergency medicine, general medicine, etc.    
The value stream map is vital in understanding the current state of the system and 
identifying waste to be eliminated.  Toyota‘s process for problem solving, and therefore 
waste reduction, is depicted in the ―Waste Reduction Model‖ (Figure 2) (Liker & Meier, 
2006).  A clear understanding of the current state value stream is necessary to begin and 
maintain this cycle of continuous improvement.   
 
Figure 2: Waste Reduction Model (Liker and Meier, 2006) 
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The overarching philosophy of the ―Waste Reduction Model‖ is waste elimination 
which focuses on elimination of non-value added process and activities in the value 
stream.  The waste reduction model lays the foundation for system-wide process 
improvement and specifically for this research, error reduction.  While the principle and 
ideal state that guides waste reduction is continuous flow, this is not always possible to 
achieve.  Where continuous flow is not possible, the value stream must be comprised of 
interdependent ―connected‖ process.  This concept is the foundation for the lean adage, 
―flow where you can, pull where you must‖ (Womack et al., 1991).  These processes are 
connected through clearly defined pull systems that link each customer and supplier 
through structured channels.  These system characteristics make deviations obvious and 
enable timely problem solving and continuous waste reduction.  This model of waste 
reduction follows with the Spear‘s ‗Rules-in-Use.‘   
Both the ―Waste Reduction Model‖ and the ―Rules-in-use‖ express the 
significance of clear and consistent communication and flow paths between the 
connected processes within a value stream.  Many manufacturing examples of value 
stream maps depict these clearly defined flow paths through linear, sequential map of 
process steps… Process 1 feeds Process 2, which feeds Process 3, which are all guided by 
information generated from a centralized source.  While this is often the introductory 
example to learn the concept of value stream mapping, it is also commonly the form that 
we see the value stream exercise take, regardless of system intricacies.  Yet attempts to fit 
the existing value stream within these constraints does one of two things: it reduces the 
scope of analysis to a singular department or basic process, or it presents an 
oversimplification of the system that does not capture true complexity.  Toyota‘s method 
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of process improvement has been so successful because it is fundamentally problem-
solving based learning that is frequent, structured, and context specific.  Therefore, what 
worked in one department or process may not work in another.  Instead, what 
practitioners tend to do is apply similar tools in a completely different setting and expect 
similar results. 
Since the value stream map is one of the first steps in taking a systems perspective 
to process improvement and moving through the waste reduction cycle, the following 
section provides an extension to the value stream map for the complex system.  While the 
real challenge lies in adapting these philosophies, principles, and tools to fit each 
individual system, the following methodology presents a different perspective, 
particularly for use in healthcare, to account for both the requisite variety and clarity of 
connections necessary to tie error reduction efforts across interdependent, yet 
semiautonomous, units to enable system-wide improvement.   
The Network Alignment Model  
The complex, non-linear value stream must be able to balance both the requisite 
variety of flow paths while clearly identifying the connections between processes and/or 
departments.  Following with the Rules-in-Use, the customers and suppliers throughout 
the value stream should be connected by clearly defined, overlapping request/response 
channels.  Clarity of these connections help make deviations, or weak signals of system 
failures, obvious and enable immediate and effective problem solving.   
To provide context, we present the value stream of admitted medical patients 
entering through the Emergency Department.  Medical patients who enter through the 
Emergency Department (ED) tend to utilize similar processes and can therefore be 
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considered the product or service family.  This group of medical patients differ from 
direct admission medical patients since they utilize a similar set of services prior to the 
Emergency Department physician‘s decision to admit.   
While there are many potential flow paths of admitted medical patients, we will 
only present the ancillary services provided by Radiology or Laboratory Services for 
explanatory purposes.  Once the attending physician makes a decision to admit the patient 
to the hospital for further care, bed coordination is notified and attempts to place the 
patient on the most appropriate unit.  The patient may require critical care services 
provided by the Medical Intensive Care Unit (MICU) or standard medical care provided 
by a general medical unit.  When general medical beds are not available, many healthcare 
organizations will place medical patients on surgical floors.  These patients are 
considered off-service and may be moved to a medical floor as medical beds become 
available or they may reside on the surgical floor for the duration of their stay in the 
hospital.  Patients who required MICU care upon admission may later transfer to a 
medical unit once their condition has stabilized.  Conversely, if a patient‘s condition 
worsens during the stay, the patient may have to move from a general medical unit into 
an MICU.  At any point during the patient‘s hospitalization, additional testing performed 
by either Radiology or Laboratory Services may be required.   
3
8
 
 
 38  
 
Figure 3: Admitted Medical Patient Technical Flow Network 
 
Even in this high-level, basic healthcare example (shown in Figure 3), the 
inherent complexity in patient flow becomes apparent.  The resulting value stream is both 
complex and non-linear.  Even this basic example violates the third Rule-in-Use since it 
is neither pre-specified nor simple.  There is an opportunity, though, for these 
connections to be self-diagnostic.  Even though this value stream can vary depending on 
individual patient needs, the various flow paths are utilized frequently enough to suggest 
there should be clearly defined request/response channels between the internal customers 
and suppliers that are capable of recognizing potentially harmful deviations.  Yet what 
often results in these semiautonomous and coupled systems is a lack of clarity regarding 
which patient is moving to what unit, at what time, and with what information.   The 
daily ambiguity that spawns in these systems creates both complacency with deviations 
and mistrust between departments resulting in the inability of the system to respond to 
early signals of failure and problem solve across boundaries.     
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The value stream mapping exercise also encourages practitioners to go to where 
the work is being done, observe, and strive to understand what is really happening 
throughout the system – not just within the component processes or departments.  During 
this process, the value stream map in Figure 3 begins to resemble a network as the 
requisite variety of flow paths is incorporated to effectively treat and manage the care for 
the admitted medical patient population.  This network, in its current form, is not all that 
different from a simple process map.  Beyond simple process maps, a major contribution 
of the value stream mapping exercise is the focus on the interdependence on the twin 
flows of material and information.  Material and information flow must both be included 
for value stream thinking to be extended into the complex, non-linear system.     
The Technical Flow Network 
The first step in understanding the complex, non-linear value stream is to identify 
all the potential customers and suppliers within the value stream.  Understanding each 
department‘s role within the larger system alone is an eye-opening experience, especially 
in an organization that has not historically pieced together individual contributions within 
this paradigm. Additionally, visually depicting the non-linearity and requisite variety of 
flow paths can be comforting to those doing the work and experiencing the chaos but can 
also provide a clear picture of the connections necessary to provide timely and accurate 
care for each patient.  Therefore, the first step lies in establishing the network shown in 
Figure 3 where each node represents a unit and each dyad represents an interdependent 
system connection between two units.   
 The Technical Flow Network – a network which establishes directional 
interdependence between the various units within a system. 
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While this flow has historically represented material flow in manufacturing, we 
refer to Figure 3 as an example of the technical flow network since the directed 
connections between internal customers and suppliers represent all of the potential 
technical flow paths required to bring either a product or service to fruition.  The 
technical flow network, though, only represents one aspect of the value creation process.  
To understand how a product or service is transformed, one must also understand the 
flow of information between the various units or processes.   
The Safety Control Network 
The communication and coordination that accompanies the technical flow 
described in Figure 3 is extremely important to the quality of care.  In order to be able to 
identify potentially dangerous deviations, each unit should establish clear expectations, as 
the respective customers and suppliers, regarding how technical work should flow 
between the units.  Furthermore, as shown in Figure 4 this communication should allow 
for open feedback between units or individuals when communication is inadequate or the 
process does not happen as expected.  This clarity in both clinical and process 
communication helps to create self-diagnostic flow paths that are both mindful and 
capable of problem solving when deviations occur.  Therefore, instead of simply referring 
to this aspect of the value stream as information flow, we will use the term safety control 
network since the effectiveness of communication along these flow paths is critical to 
catching errors before they become failures and problem solving to continuously improve 
throughout the system.   
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 The Safety Control Network – a network which assesses organizational 
coordination or each area‘s ability to function as both a customer and supplier 
within the network.  
The successful unit will have a clear understanding of customer requirements and will 
effectively resolve problems with suppliers to ensure they do not happen in the future. 
 
 
Figure 4: Cross-unit Coordination 
 
While communication regarding technical flow usually follows the technical flow 
paths, intermediaries and centralized information systems can generate additional flow 
paths within an already complex system.  For instance, in the admitted medical patient 
example, as soon as a patient is admitted, bed coordination will be notified electronically 
and will begin the search for the most appropriate bed given the clinical information 
found within the electronic medical record.  Bed coordination is often used to facilitate 
patient moves between the Emergency Department (ED), medical units, surgical units, 
and intensive care units.  In many cases, if a patient requires intensive care services and 
an MICU bed is available, the decision to move the patient will occur directly between 
the ED and the MICU.  If a bed is not available and there is a patient in the ED in 
immediate need of MICU level care, bed coordinators must be notified of the priority to 
find a general medical bed for the most stable patient currently within the MICU.  In this 
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case, the timeliness of care for the critical patient in the ED rests on the ability of the 
system to effectively communicate and adjust to provide quality care to each patient.  
Any misunderstanding or delay in communication in the safety control network shown in 
Figure 5 will jeopardize patient safety and is increasingly considered by governmental 
agencies such as the IOM to be a preventable medical error.    
 
Figure 5: Admitted Medical Patient Safety Control Network 
 
While the safety control network identifies the flow of important communication 
regarding technical flow, it must be paired with the technical flow network to truly 
understand how value is created throughout the system.  Therefore, wherever there is 
technical flow there should also be clear communication regarding expectations and 
problem solving when deviations occur.  It is alignment of these two networks that will 
support practitioners in the process of tying error reduction efforts across units to enable 
system-wide improvement.   
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Aligning the Technical Flow and Safety Control Networks 
 While the first step in mapping the complex, non-linear value stream requires an 
understanding of all of the directed relationships (denoting each internal customer and 
supplier) the second step requires analysis of the alignment between the technical flow 
network and the safety control network.  By aligning these networks, practitioners can 
begin to understand where gaps exist between the semiautonomous yet interdependent 
units throughout the system.  
 
Figure 6: Network Alignment Approach 
 
While networks have been historically used to model organization structures and 
human relations, they have only recently been used to identify alignment of 
organizational structures and technical communication networks (Sosa, Eppinger, & 
Rowles, 2004).  This research was expanded in a 2007 study on the impact of product 
architecture and organizational structure on efficiency and quality in complex product 
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development projects.  To analyze the degree of alignment, the researchers defined a 
metric called a coordination deficit, which measures the extent to which organizational 
coordination falls short of product connectivity in complex product development 
(Gokpinar, Hopp, & Iravani, 2010).  This same concept can be applied to the complex 
value stream mapping process.   
The proposed model aligns the technical flow of a product or service, the 
technical flow network, with the ability to clearly define customer requirements and 
problem solve with suppliers, the safety control network.  Aligning both the product 
(technical flow) and information (safety control) streams as shown in Figure 6 has 
implications for architectural simplification, information clarity, and problem 
identification (Spear, 1999).  This type of alignment should reduce the risk of the supplier 
receiving multiple, possibly conflicting requests, which ultimately reduces errors 
throughout the entire delivery process.  To use this tool as a way to incorporate the 
requisite variety of flow paths in complex systems, while creating ―connected‖ 
interdependent processes that enable waste reduction and continuous improvement, one 
must understand where the gaps exist.   
 
NETWORK ALIGNMENT APPROACHES: IDENTIFYING THE GAPS 
 
One of the most valuable aspects of the value stream mapping exercise is the 
process of going to where the work is being done to observe and understanding how 
value is created throughout the system.  Once the practitioner or team has gone to the 
4
5
 
 
 45  
floor to map the technical flow and safety control networks, there are two ways to 
analyze the alignment and identify gaps. 
Detailed Analytic Approach 
The first approach to understanding where the gaps exist throughout the system 
employs detailed analysis with quantitative weights for the dyads in each network.  While 
the ideal system would have clear, self-diagnostic communication channels between 
every interdependent unit, it may not be feasible to do so all at once.  To understand the 
extent of each gap for prioritization, the detailed analytic approach quantitatively 
determines the extent to which each dyad‘s technical flow (or interdependence) is aligned 
with that same connection‘s ability to function as both a customer and supplier within the 
system.     
In a simplified case of the admitted medical patient flow example, gaps between 
the technical flow of a patient and communication between the various internal customers 
and suppliers are calculated by aligning the two networks as shown in Figure 7.  The 
links, referred to as dyads, in the technical flow network are assigned weights based on 
the percentage of patient specimens that travel along a given path.  For example, if 90% 
of all patients travel between Radiology and the ED, the dyad connecting these two areas 
is given a weight of .90.  Since a patient may come and go from a given unit several 
times, the outgoing flow weights can exceed 1.0.   
The links regarding technical communication form the safety control network, 
which can be based on survey responses to the clarity of customer requirements and 
feedback/problem resolution.  If all the employees in Radiology agree that there is 
complete clarity in the Emergency Department‘s customer requirements and if all the 
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employees within the Emergency Department agree that process deviations from 
Radiology are tracked and promptly resolved, this dyad in the safety control network 
would receive 100%, or 1.0.   
 
Figure 7: Detailed Analytic Alignment 
 
Once weights for all dyads in both the technical flow and safety control networks 
have been established, the coordination assessment for each unit can be calculated as 
described in Figure 8.  The coordination assessment represents the extent to which the 
flow network is aligned with the safety control network for each node or unit within the 
system and is calculated by summing the product of all aligning technical flow and safety 
control dyads.  Once all products are summed, the average is taken to represent each 
unit‘s ability to function as both a customer and supplier within the system.  While the 
intent of the network alignment approach is to identify dyadic gaps between units, each 
unit must first understand the role it plays within the greater system.  For example, as 
shown in Figure 7, the coordination assessment for the ED is the product of the weights 
in the technical flow network and the safety control network.   
 This yields a coordination assessment for the ED as a customer of (0.9*1.0) = 0.9 
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 This yields a coordination assessment for the ED as a supplier of (0.6*0.5) + 
(0.7*0.2) + (0.4*0.2) = 0.3 + 0.14 + 0.08 = 0.52 
 Therefore, the ability of the ED to function as both a customer and a supplier 
within the system is denoted by an overall coordination assessment of (0.9 + 
0.52)/2 = 0.71 
Since each unit will have varying degrees of technical flow into and out of their 
unit, there is not a baseline coordination assessment to denote either good or poor 
coordination within the system.  Instead, the coordination assessment is a metric that is 
unique to each individual unit.  Therefore, the coordination assessment should be 
continuously evaluated to identify opportunities for improvement.  Once all units have 
their coordination assessments calculated, each unit can determine the weakest area of 
alignment within all of their connections.  In the above example, at first glance it appears 
that coordination between the ED and the surgical units is lowest (a product of 0.08).  
When we look at the ideal for each connection though, the coordination between the ED 
and the MICU has the most opportunity for improvement (currently at 0.14 with an ideal 
potential score of 0.7).  In this respect, the ability of the ED to function as a supplier to 
the MICU should be of high priority.  By comparing the current state of coordination to 
the ideal, each unit can identify those connections that are most likely to either generate 
or miss errors as they propagate throughout the system.  By continuously improving upon 
each unit‘s coordination assessment, the complex system can begin to tie error reduction 
efforts across the multiple interdependent, yet semiautonomous, units to enable system-
wide improvement.   
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The Coordination Assessment 
 The Coordination Assessment – a metric which measures the extent to 
which the technical flow network is aligned with the safety control 
network. 
If we let   and   represent the technical flow network and safety 
control networks, respectively, where   = [   
 ], and   
  represents the 
weight of the link between nodes i and j in the directed network k,k = F, S.  We 
then define: 
     =   
 /(∑i   
 ) so that     (and    ) represents the weight of 
interdependence (proportion of technical flow) between unit i and unit j 
(and j to i) in the technical flow network, 
     =   
  as area i‘s assessment of the clarity of j‘s requirements, and 
     =   
  as area i‘s assessment of problem resolution with j. 
Finally, we define βi as the Coordination Assessment (CA) for node 
(unit) i as: 
 βi = (∑         )+ ∑         ))/2 
 
 
Figure 8: Calculating the Coordination Assessment 
 
 
Once each unit‘s gaps are identified, each unit should work with the appropriate 
adjacent unit to understand how and why they scored poorly on a certain aspect and strive 
to improve each aspect, one at a time, following the scientific method.  This approach 
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utilizes each unit‘s inherent modularity, or semiautonomous nature, to design, test, and 
improve upon the weaknesses identified within the greater system.  
Visual Management Approach 
The path to alignment between the complex technical flow and safety control 
network does not have to involve detailed, quantitative analysis.  As previously 
mentioned, a major contribution of the VSM as a tool is the process of going where the 
work is being performed and physically seeing how value is created.  It is through this 
process that waste becomes apparent. 
Instead of assigning quantitative weights to the dyads in each network, a cross-
functional team (composed of all the represented units in the two networks) can also 
assign qualitative weights such as low, medium, or high.  In the case of the simplified 
admitted medical patient flow in Figure 7, Radiology would have high technical 
interdependence with the ED and strong safety control mechanisms (clarity of customer 
requirements and problem resolution with suppliers).   
While determining the weights of technical interdependence may be more straight 
forward (based upon simple frequency of flow between units), agreeing upon the weights 
of the safety control network may be more difficult.  In order to guide the team towards 
consensus on the effectiveness of communication across each connection, a simple set of 
questions can be developed by each team to determine each unit‘s ability to act as both a 
customer and supplier to all other adjacent units within the network.  To be most 
effective, these questions should be tailored to the context of the work being performed, 
but a general set of questions to be answered by the appropriate parties relative to each 
unit may include:     
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Clarity of Customer Requirements (to be answered by the suppliers): 
1. Is every member in our unit (on all shifts) aware of our customers‘ needs 
regarding accuracy and timeliness of service? 
2. Are the customers‘ requirements documented and/or easy to locate? 
3. Are the customers‘ requirements consistent across the individuals within their 
department? 
Problem Resolution with Suppliers (to be answered by the customers): 
1. Is there a clearly identifiable and available representative within the unit that any 
team member can contact in the event of an error or question? 
2. Does the upstream (supplying) unit respond quickly and thoroughly to resolve 
potential issues and problem solve with the downstream (customer) unit? 
3. Are process changes that will affect the product or service to the downstream unit 
communicated appropriately? 
As the team identifies the most appropriate questions to ask of each customer and 
supplier relationship, the team can also lay the groundwork for evaluating the 
effectiveness of these relationships.  For example, if a unit were to score well on only one 
question within each set, they would likely receive a low weight along that particular 
dyad in the safety control network. 
Once the dyads are weighted, the group can begin to evaluate the difference 
between the current state and the ideal for each potential connection based on the 
qualitative assessments.  As is the case for the detailed analytic approach, having each 
unit take responsibility for their weakest system connection will build upon the inherent 
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modularity in these systems to ensure that those that do the value adding work are also 
those that design and improve the work locally.   
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Complex systems such as healthcare have a vast array of loosely coupled yet 
interdependent units that must work together to provide timely and accurate care for each 
patient.  The complexity inherent to these systems often engenders silos and 
fragmentation which can make coordination and system-wide improvement difficult.  
While loose coupling reduces coordination between units, it does not imply poor 
coordination.  This work aims to answer the question, ―How can complex systems tie 
error reduction efforts across interdependent, yet semiautonomous, units to enable 
system-wide improvement?‖  By taking cues from high reliability organizations and lean 
such as requisite variety and the ‗rules-in-use,‘ the complex system can problem solve 
and continuously improve without making simplifying assumptions just to make an 
approach or tool fit.  
Since each unit has multiple potential interdependencies, it is important to clearly 
identify each unit‘s internal customers and suppliers.  Each unit must also understand to 
whom they are a customer and/or a supplier.  In order to define the current state and 
visualize these relationships, we extend the value stream map (VSM) to the complex 
system.  The value stream map is a powerful tool for understanding the current state, 
identifying opportunities, and continuously improving towards an ideal, but it is rarely 
modified for use beyond linear, sequential processes.  A modification to the traditional 
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VSM is presented to help healthcare practitioners improve problem solving, and 
ultimately reduce errors, beyond departmental boundaries in the complex, nonlinear value 
stream. While this approach can be adopted by other complex systems that struggle with 
problem solving and process improvement across non-linear and loosely coupled units, 
this work fundamentally presents the importance of establishing contextual needs when 
determining the appropriate approach to error reduction and process improvement.  The 
Detailed Analytic Approach and the Visual Management Approach to managing the 
complex, nonlinear value stream each offer a method for identification of internal 
customer and supplier relationships with a gap between the current ability to coordinate 
and the ideal.  Both approaches utilize the inherent semiautonomous nature, or 
modularity, of units to own and improve upon their weakest connections for greater fit 
within the organization.  In doing so, the system can reap the benefits of both loose and 
tight coupling and can move error reduction efforts beyond departmental boundaries.  It 
is through this process that the whole system reliability is improved.   
The inherent modularity of complex systems can make coordination and system-wide 
improvement difficult.  This work presented a methodology for analyzing the cross-unit 
connections, or dyads, that tie the system together.  By utilizing either the Detailed 
Analytic or Visual Management Approach, practitioners can begin to understand the 
interconnectedness of operations.  Additionally, these approaches will help to identify 
where problems, or gaps between the current state and the ideal, exist.   
 Identifying gaps is only the first step in tying patient safety efforts across the 
complex system.  These gaps become the motivation for system-wide continuous 
improvement.  The ability to improve those connections requires a new way of thinking 
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about the way problems are identified and continuously improved across organizational 
boundaries.  While this work presents methodologies to identify where gaps exist, in the 
next chapter we will better understand how cross-unit coordination, along with other 
organizational factors, influence safety culture and overall quality within a system.  The 
role of leadership becomes vital to creating a culture where structured and frequent 
problem solving across organizational boundaries becomes habit.  This is where system-
wide improvement across the complex system becomes difficult.   
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CHAPTER III:  CROSS-UNIT COORDINATION:  METHODS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The modern integrated health system has a multitude of hospitals, offices, clinics, 
and departments that work together to provide comprehensive and seamless patient care 
(Plsek, 2000).  The past two decades have seen an increase in the integrated nature of the 
U.S. health system (Crosson, 2009).  While organizational and financial structures 
continue towards the integrated model, many fail to develop processes to link the 
components within the system (Burns & Pauly, 2002).  While interdependent, many units 
within the integrated health system function with little control or refinement of the inputs 
and outputs to each unit.  Instead, patient care is often focused within the boundaries of a 
singular unit (de Souza & Pidd, 2009; Hillman, Braithwaite, & Chen, 2011).  While 
formally organized within an integrated model, the coordination between components is 
often unchanged.  This lack of coordination between units can be referred to as gaps in 
patient care (Cook et al., 2000).  
There is little research on the identification of organizational gaps between units 
and the gaps‘ impact on patient safety.  Instead, previous literature has  focused on ways 
to bridge all connections through standardized handoffs under the assumption that gaps in 
care influence safety (Haig, Sutton, & Whittington, 2006; Manser, Foster, Gisin, Jaeckel, 
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& Ummenhofer, 2010).  While leaders may strive to achieve local-level goals, efforts are 
largely focused within their span-of-control.  These silo improvement efforts are 
therefore rarely capable of achieving widespread improvement.   
In contrast to previous literature, in this paper we direct our attention to the 
strategic identification of gaps across organizational boundaries.  In this study we test the 
impact that gaps in cross-unit coordination have the unit‘s safety culture, or the attitudes, 
beliefs, perceptions, and values that employees share in relation to safety.  We study 
cross-unit coordination in detail by investigating the transfer of patient specimens and 
information across several laboratory units within a large, academic health system.  
Associations found between cross-unit coordination and safety culture, quality, and 
process improvement support the ongoing identification of gaps for system-wide 
improvement.   
This chapter contributes to the research body concerned with patient safety and 
process improvement in large, complex systems such as healthcare by (1) establishing the 
importance of cross-unit coordination and its role in systemic improvement, (2) 
forwarding the coordination assessment as a metric for gap identification, and (3) 
emphasizing the importance of problem solving across organizational boundaries for 
increased patient safety.  The findings of this work suggest that clearly defined customer 
(downstream unit) expectations are significantly associated with safety culture, which in 
turn is significantly correlated to perceptions of quality.  This work also suggests that the 
ability to problem solve across organizational boundaries has potentially important 
implications for patient safety but does not appear to be practiced widely or consistently 
within the complex health system.   
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we 
review the literature on safety culture, organizational boundaries, and process 
improvement.  We also review the methods forwarded in the previous paper for gap 
identification.  In section three we develop our hypotheses, and in section four we discuss 
the industry setting, data, and methods utilized to test the hypotheses.  Section five 
presents the results, and section six concludes the paper with a discussion of the 
implication for research and management.   
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Complex organizations have a vast network of interdependent departments and 
people that work together to provide a product or service to the customer.  In the case of 
healthcare, each patient has unique needs.  Each patient‘s unique needs may require the 
expertise of several teams of care givers.  The multidisciplinary nature of healthcare often 
requires coordination between several departments or individuals to both diagnose and 
treat the patient.  The connections between units may be utilized to physically transfer a 
patient or their specimen.  In addition to the physical transfer of the patient or their lab 
work, cross-unit connections are also extremely valuable in knowledge transfer.  This 
work examines if and how the coordinated strength of a cross-unit connection impacts 
safety culture, and ultimately system-wide quality.   
Safety Culture 
The concept of safety culture and its implications on quality and patient safety 
have been a focus within the patient safety literature (Shojania, Duncan, McDonald, 
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Wachter, & Markowitz, 2001; Nieva & Sorra, 2003; Singer, Gaba, Geppert, Sinaiko, 
Howard, & Park, 2003).  The concept of safety culture originated after the 1986 
Chernobyl disaster (Pidgeon, 1991).  The post-accident review used the term to describe 
the characteristics and attitudes within the organization that are required to give 
potentially disastrous safety issues the attention they deserve.   The term safety culture 
has since been utilized in several high reliability organizations to understand and analyze 
organizational safety beliefs, values, and attitudes of groups and/or individuals.   
Research surrounding safety culture has grown in the past decade, especially 
within healthcare (Colla, Bracken, Kinney, & Weeks, 2005).  The Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) outlines the key components to a culture of safety by 
acknowledgement of the high-risk nature of the work and a commitment to safety, a 
blame-free environment where individuals can openly report errors or near-misses, 
collaboration across ranks and disciplines to resolve patient safety problems, and an 
organizational commitment to address safety concerns.  To measure the safety culture, 
the AHRQ provides validated surveys for various provider levels and departments within 
healthcare.  These surveys have been widely utilized to monitor and improve the safety 
culture within healthcare (Nieva & Sorra, 2003; Singla, Kitch, Weissman, & Campbell, 
2006).   
Pidgeon and O‘Leary suggest four factors that support a ‗good‘ safety culture 
(Pidgeon & O‘Leary, 1994).  These factors include senior management commitment to 
safety, shared care and concern for hazards and their impacts, realistic and flexible norms 
and rules about hazards, and continual reflection upon practice through monitoring, 
analysis, and feedback systems (organizational learning).  The last factor suggests that as 
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problem solving improves, the organization learns and the safety culture improves.  Due 
to the organic nature of these factors, the safety culture of an organization evolves over 
time and develops as a result of history, environment, health and safety practices, and 
leadership (Reason, 1998).   
There is little debate over the importance of safety culture and the impact the 
concept has on adverse events within organizations (Yule, 2003; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 
2007).  While the importance of safety culture is not debated, few authors have gone 
beyond face validity and supported their claims by reporting predictive validity 
(Guldenmund, 2000).  Furthermore, there is a need to refine the concept and create a 
better understanding of organizational contributors to safety culture that will become a 
basis for culture-enhancing practices (Reason, 1998).   
Organizational Boundaries and Patient Safety 
Cross-unit gaps are one factor discussed in the literature that is often associated 
with patient safety (Cook et al., 2000; Nemeth, Hollnagel, & Dekker, 2009).  Gaps that 
occur across organizational boundaries can be defined as system discontinuities.  Cook, 
Render, and Woods (2000) note that the opportunity for failures as a result of gaps is 
large, but the incidence of failure is low due to the ability of practitioners to identify and 
bridge gaps.  Similarly, Tushman noted the importance of subunit communication on the 
organization‘s ability to deal with uncertainty (Tushman, 1979).  To address the issue of 
coordination across organizational boundaries, several researchers have focused attention 
on taxonomies of coordination (Adler, 1995), how organizational structure impacts 
communication across organizational boundaries, and aspects of successful coordination 
(Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000).   
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The cross-unit transfer of the patient and their information is commonly referred 
to as a ‗hand off‘ in healthcare.  The passing of information between units is an area of 
focus in healthcare and patient safety research.  A spike in this research occurred in 2007, 
shortly after the Joint Commission published a new requirement in their 2006 National 
Patient Safety Goals.  The 2006 requirement reads: ―Implement a standard approach to 
‗hand off‘ communications, including an opportunity to ask and respond to questions.‖  
The justification for this new requirement was included in the following 2008 Joint 
Commission handbook:  ―The primary objective of a ‗hand off‘ is to provide accurate 
information about a [patient‘s] care, treatment, and services, current condition and any 
recent or anticipated changes.  The information communicated during a hand off must be 
accurate in order to meet [patient] safety goals.‖ 
Petersen et al (Petersen, Brennan, O'Neil, Cook, & Lee, 1994) showed the impact 
of physician cross-coverage, or the transfer of care to a physician outside the patient‘s 
assigned care team, with an increased incidence of preventable adverse events.  The 
study, though, was focused on cross-coverage and not the exchange of information or 
―handoff.‖  In a retrospective study of adverse events and their ―root causes‖ the Joint 
Commission identified ―communication problems‖ as the leading cause of sentinel events 
in all categories in 2005.  Handoffs happen frequently throughout a patient‘s care 
(Dracup & Morris, 2008) and are a critical channel in the exchange of patient 
information.  It is therefore reasonable to assume that they are also a critical point for loss 
of information and risk to patient safety.  While there are a number of articles that assume 
an association between ―hand offs‖ and patient safety, there are few empirical studies 
which support this assumption (Riesenberg, Leitzsch, Massucci, Jaeger, Rosenfeld, 
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Patow, Padmore, & Karpovich, 2009; Cohen & Hilligoss, 2010; Patterson & Wears, 
2010; Riesenberg, Leisch, & Cunningham, 2010).    
Hand off is not the only term associated with the transfer of knowledge, patient 
care, and lab work.  ‗Hand over,‘ ‗nursing report,‘ ‗report,‘ and ‗sign-out‘ are other terms 
commonly used in various healthcare settings.  These terms are often used in slightly 
different contexts, ―such as ‗sign-out‘ with its suggestion of a temporary delegation of 
formal authority for decisions and of legal responsibility for consequences, as might 
occur at a shift change to overnight care‖ (Cohen & Hilligoss, 2010).  The transfer of 
knowledge that is required at sign-out is similar to the communication required when a 
patient or their lab work is physically moved to a new department within the system.  
While the terms are similar, there are distinct challenges that arise in coordinating patient 
care across organizational boundaries.   
The Joint Commission defines the objective of a ‗hand off‘ around the transfer of 
accurate patient information.  In this work, we are not only concerned with the transfer of 
information but with the ability of organizations to tie process improvements across units 
for system-wide improvement in patient safety.  Therefore, we focus on the ability of 
interdependent units to problem solve and improve.  Because this work investigates the 
ability of interdependent units to coordinate across organizational boundaries, we forward 
the term ‗cross-unit coordination‘ to focus the discussion.  While the term cross-unit 
coordination has been utilized by organizational theorists to describe lateral coordination 
across organizational boundaries (Daft, 2004)  it has not been formally defined.  
Therefore, we define ‗cross-unit coordination‘ as the ability to effectively communicate 
and problem solve across an organizational boundary between one sending (upstream) 
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unit and one receiving (downstream) unit.  By refining the scope of the ‗hand off‘ 
discussion common to healthcare literature, this paper establishes a new focus on cross-
unit coordination and investigates its impact on safety culture, and ultimately patient 
safety.   
Problem Solving across Organizational Boundaries 
Cross-unit coordination is a concept that applies when two distinct and 
interdependent units coordinate to provide a product or service.  This separation and 
coordination is often referred to as modularity in organizational design (Ro, Liker, & 
Fixson, 2007).  Modularity is a general set of principles utilized to manage complexity 
within any type of system.  By breaking up a complex system into manageable 
components, an organization can increase both flexibility and expertise (Sanchez, 1996; 
Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Langlois, 2002).  Certain organizations choose to become more 
or less modular, while others are naturally organized in interdependent groups due to 
inherent complexity and specialization.  While there are many benefits to the move 
towards modularization, there are also potential disadvantages to this type of 
organizational design.  Modularity may require independence and ―loose coupling‖ 
between units, and may not be effective when there is either tight coupling or interactive 
complexity (Bierly, Gallagher, & Spender, 2008).  This independence can inhibit 
problem solving efforts when work is dispersed across organizational boundaries (Gomes 
& Joglekar, 2008).   
Problem solving between units enables coordination necessary to identify errors 
and establish processes that prevent future errors.  In order for the organization to 
collectively learn, its members must learn to become something larger than the individual 
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or subunit, connecting to one another in ways that create new meaning and system-wide 
improvement (Senge, 1993).   
Several researchers highlight the importance of lateral coordination and 
communication across the organization.  Womack, Jones, and Roos highlight the 
importance of clear communication and expectations between upstream and downstream 
units in improving the value stream, or all the actions needed to bring a product to a 
customer (Womack et al., 1991).  In research in complex organizations, Spear identifies 
gaps between units and workarounds that are created in the absence of problem solving 
(Spear & Schmidhofer, 2005).  What sets the operations of organizations like Toyota and 
others apart, is the way they couple the process of doing work with the process of 
learning to do it better as its being done (Spear, 2005).  This aspect of Toyota is an 
integrated part of the culture that both fosters process improvement and is a result of 
process improvement.  A culture of continuous improvement is the differentiating factor 
between organizations that implement process improvement tools superficially and those 
that continuously identify problems, create countermeasures, test, and adjust the process 
until goals are achieved (Liker & Franz, 2011).  Spear highlighted Toyota‘s unique 
ability to utilize connections across the organization for problem solving and continuous 
improvement to enable true system-wide improvement.  (Spear, 1999).   
The Coordination Assessment 
The previous paper forwarded the concept of the Network Alignment Approach 
as a method to visually map the connectedness of units in a complex system and identify 
the gaps that may prevent system-wide improvement.  There are two methods 
practitioners can utilize to identify organizational gaps.  The first method, the Detailed 
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Analytic Approach, is more quantitative in nature and requires volume and survey data to 
assess the existence and severity of gaps between interdependent units within a system.  
The second method, The Visual Management Approach, is targeted towards team-based 
exercises between multidisciplinary leaders and team members to identify areas for 
opportunity.  Since this work is focused on understanding the implications of cross-unit 
coordination on patient safety and system-wide improvement, we utilize the Detailed 
Analytic Approach to empirically test our hypotheses.   
In order to quantitatively assess cross-unit coordination, the network of 
interdependencies must first be mapped to display all the potential connections between 
units required to deliver a product or service to the customer.  The network diagram is 
then duplicated to depict two aspects of the system.  In one network, the technical 
coupling is depicted by assigning weights to the connections, or dyads, between units 
based upon the volume of work that is passed from one unit to another.  This network is 
referred to as the Technical Flow Network.  In the second network, coordination is 
assessed along each connection, or dyad, based upon the units‘ ability to clearly define 
downstream requirements and problem solve upstream when deviations occur.  The 
ability of the two units to coordinate can be determined through survey data.  The 
network is referred to as the Safety Control Network and the weights assigned to each 
connection represent the extent to which there is explicit communication about 
downstream requirements and problem solving with upstream suppliers. 
Within the Detailed Analytic Approach, the Coordination Assessment is 
forwarded as a metric which represents the extent to which the Technical Flow Network 
is aligned with the Safety Control Network within a system (see Figure 8 in Chapter 2).   
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In other words, one would expect that units that are tightly coupled within a system have 
clear process standards and are able to problem solve when deviations occur.  
Conversely, if two units are tightly coupled but cross-unit coordination is weak, then 
those connections would instead be considered gaps and become a focus for process 
improvement and patient safety efforts.  The Coordination Assessment therefore becomes 
a metric to quantitatively assess the effectiveness of cross-unit coordination between two 
interdependent, yet semiautonomous units.   
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
The Network Alignment approach provides a methodology to proactively identify 
gaps across complex systems. In addition to cross-unit gaps, process improvement 
efforts, error tracking, and clearly documented processes all have the potential to impact 
a system‘s safety culture.  All else being equal, a strong safety culture, where team 
members proactively identify and solve problems, should contribute to improved quality 
across the system. In this section we formulate hypotheses on how several factors might 
influence safety culture, and in turn, how that safety culture impacts quality.         
Cross-Unit Coordination 
Several studies have suggested underlying factors or components of safety 
culture.  Two common factors found within this body of research include the proactive 
identification and resolution of problems as well as leadership commitment to safety.  In 
this study, we focus closely on one important aspect of safety culture: continual reflection 
upon practice through monitoring, analysis, and feedback systems (Pidgeon, 1991).  
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Since this study is focused on cross-unit coordination and system-wide improvement, we 
focus on the reflection of practice across organizational boundaries.  Since the ability to 
identify and resolve problems has been a focal point within the safety culture literature, 
one could suspect that the ability to problem solve and improve processes between 
interdependent units, or strength of cross-unit coordination, will improve the overall 
safety culture of these units which leads us to our first hypothesis:  Cross-unit 
coordination, as measured by the Coordination Assessment, is positively associated with 
safety culture.  More specifically, when we consider the Coordination Assessment as 
being comprised of two components, we formulate two hypotheses: 
H1a: Problem Solving with Suppliers is positively associated with safety culture. 
H1b: Clarity of Customer Requirements is positively associated with safety 
culture. 
Process Improvement Efforts 
Spear (Spear, 1999) highlighted Toyota‘s unique ability to utilize clear request 
and response channels across organizational boundaries to quickly identify deviations and 
problem solve.  When improvements across connections span multiple units or 
departments, localized improvement efforts evolve into system-wide organizational 
improvement.  While process improvement efforts and safety culture theoretically appear 
to have a cyclical relationship (improvement efforts create a stronger safety culture and 
vice versa), we specifically test the former hypothesis which suggests that units that place 
greater value on process improvement will also have a stronger safety culture.  One could 
expect that as problem identification and problem-solving efforts become engrained into 
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the culture, team members will feel more comfortable and confident in the proactive 
identification of potentially harmful errors.  This leads to our second hypothesis: 
H2:  The strength of process improvement efforts is positively associated with 
safety culture. 
Error Documentation 
The under reporting of medical errors, adverse events, and near misses has been 
an issue in healthcare for as long as errors have been tracked.  The reasons for 
underreporting include loss of reputation, fear of losing their job, loss of market share, 
loss of accreditation, and liability concerns (Dragseth, 2001).  Since we focus on 
organizational contributors to safety culture, we hypothesize that departments or units 
that report errors openly and without blame as a part of daily operations would also have 
a stronger safety culture: 
H3:  Error documentation is positively associated with safety culture. 
Standard Work 
While problem solving is an inherently flexible and adaptive task, it is also most 
effective when there are clear and visible process expectations.  These standards allow for 
deviations from the process, and likely errors, to become increasingly salient.  By 
establishing clear and visible guidelines for a process, deviations from the standard 
should be identified more easily and openly within a unit. 
H4: Availability of standard work is positively associated with safety culture. 
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Safety Culture and Quality 
A strong safety culture is often assessed by the extent of a blame-free 
environment where team members are able to report errors or near misses without fear of 
reprimand or punishment.  An underlying assumption made within the safety culture 
literature is that if the safety culture improves, errors will be identified, the organizational 
will learn from the errors, which will enable prevention against future errors.  As team 
members become more informed about the numerous factors that have an impact on 
safety systems, safety culture will improve and become the ―engine that drives the system 
towards the goal of sustaining the maximum resistance towards its operational hazards‖ 
(Reason, 1998).   Thus, we hypothesize that as safety culture improves, quality also 
improves: 
H5: Safety culture is positively associated with quality.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
We explore the above formulated hypotheses in the context of a laboratory setting 
in a large, academic health system.  In the following section we describe the processes 
and interdependent units that comprise the case setting as well as the data and methods 
utilized to test our hypotheses.    
Industry Setting: Anatomic Pathology 
Anatomic Pathology is the study of structural changes that occur in organs and 
tissues as a result of disease.  There are several areas of specialization within Anatomic 
Pathology.  While some are more common than others, large, academic health systems 
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often have representation and expertise in each of these specialties which offer a larger 
array of studies that can be utilized to diagnose disease.  As a result, these larger health 
systems often provide consultations to patients with primary care in other, smaller health 
systems.  While Anatomic Pathology specialties are not necessarily different units, they 
often require different processing techniques which are often organized as separate units 
within Anatomic Pathology.  Given the complexity of the diagnosis process, patient 
specimens can be routed and re-routed between processing units at the pathologists‘ 
discretion.  The following section describes the case of one Anatomic Pathology 
department.   
 The department of Anatomic Pathology (AP) at one large, academic health 
system receives anywhere from 300 to 1,000 patient tissue samples to be processed daily 
to test for a variety of cancers.  This AP department houses over eight smaller processing 
laboratories which interact with technicians, pathologists, the hospital, and each other on 
a daily basis.  In total, the case under analysis is comprised of 18 interdependent, yet 
semiautonomous units within the overarching Anatomic Pathology system.  The 
individual labs within Anatomic Pathology are dependent on one another for processing 
and evaluating tissue samples.  Both the physical sample and patient paperwork travel 
between labs within AP.  While many of the labs are dependent on one another, there few 
standards conveying expectations about how or when patient samples and paperwork 
should arrive.   
This research began by observing all of the possible specimen flow paths within 
the Anatomic Pathology department.  Specimens, in the form of tissue samples, can 
originate within the overarching health system (i.e. within operating room), in client 
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hospitals (the health system under study is comprised of 3 main hospitals, 40 health 
centers, and 120 outpatient clinics), or at an outpatient clinical laboratory.  From their 
point of origin, specimens can be sent directly to the dermatopathology suite, faculty 
suites (primarily for consultations), the main hospital mail room, central distribution, or 
surgical pathology accessioning.  A lack of a standard submittal process and variability in 
specimen needs results in variability in specimen arrival to the department.   
Once patient specimens are accessioned into the information system, they are sent 
to a grossing station depending on how the specimen is categorized (breast, 
dermatopathology, endocrine, gastrointestinal, head and neck, neuropathology, renal, and 
ophthalmic pathology).  The technician (pathologist, pathologists‘ assistant, or resident) 
grosses the tissue by visually inspecting the sample and dictating diagnostic information 
into the medical record system.    Once the specimen is grossed, the grossing technician 
places sections of the tissue sample into plastic blocks.  The blocks of tissue are then sent 
to the histology lab to be chemically treated, embedded in paraffin, and cut into thin 
layers which are placed onto a glass microscope slide.  There may be as few as one or as 
many as fifty slides containing cross-sections from one tissue sample.  These slides can 
be sent directly to a pathologist or to one or more of the other processing labs 
(Immunohistochemistry ―IPOX,‖ Cytopathology, Special Stains, Clinical Pathology 
―CP,‖ Autopsy, Hematopathology, and Electron Microscopy).  These labs provide a 
number of different diagnostic tests for different variants of cancer and non-cancerous 
diseases. 
Since dozens of slides can be cut from one tissue sample, a pathologist can call 
for several different processes.  Each stain (technique utilized to highlight various aspects 
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of the tissue) or process is then performed on a different microscope slide to be examined 
by the pathologist.  These tests can be requested prior to accessioning or in response to 
questions raised by the pathologist during processing.  This aspect of clinical testing adds 
to the overall complexity of the system by introducing non-linear flow paths.  A visual 
example of all the potential specimen flow paths can be seen in Figure 9.  Each unit, or 
node, is color coded based upon its overall function within the Anatomic Pathology 
system.  Green nodes represent a point of origin into the system, dark blue nodes sort and 
register specimens, light blue nodes cut and modify the tissue for examination, black 
nodes represent units that process the tissue within Anatomic Pathology, red nodes 
represent units that process the tissue within Clinical Pathology, and purple represent 
diagnosis and storage units.  This diagram highlights the vast number of path 
permutations and interdependencies found within an Anatomic Pathology department.   
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Figure 9: Anatomic Pathology Flow Network 
 
This research will focus on how cross-unit coordination between the internal units 
impacts the overall safety culture within the Anatomic Pathology system.  Furthermore, 
we investigate how additional factors contribute to safety culture and if safety culture, or 
other organizational factors, impact quality within the lab.  This approach will attempt to 
understand the extent to which direct, clearly defined, overlapping request and response 
channels between units reduces the risk that the pathologist receives a slide that 
misrepresents the sampled tissue, misrepresents the patient, or is not prepared according 
to industry standards.  Additionally, this work demonstrates how this coordination can 
impact the ability of a system to identify and solve problems for improved patient safety.    
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Unit of Analysis 
While we are primarily interested in understanding the implications of cross-unit 
coordination in improving system-wide patient safety, our study utilizes individual 
perceptions of quality, safety culture, and engagement in process improvement efforts.  
Therefore, our unit of analysis is the individual team member who is located in one of the 
units, or nodes, within the system.  Since we place an emphasis on cross-unit 
coordination, the team member also assesses the alignment of specimen flow and 
coordination between all upstream and downstream units.  While team member 
assessments within units may vary, this approach utilizes a consistent unit of analysis and 
helps us to avoid both ecological and exception errors in reasoning.  In other words, we 
respectively avoid generalizations about certain units based upon averages and we also 
avoid conclusions about a particular unit based upon a particular individual.  Instead, we 
are able to understand how perceptions of connectedness and coordination are associated 
with safety culture.   
Methodology 
This work will utilize an embedded, case study design that incorporates statistical 
surveys to empirically test our hypotheses as well as open-ended questions and direct 
observations to provide context to the quantitative analysis.  Triangulation of the data 
through case study provides a more holistic understanding of the results (Jick, 1979).  
The case study is an appropriate method for understanding the complex, health care 
system  (Yin, 1999).  This is in large part because the case study is best utilized in 
―situations where the number of variables far outstrip the number of data points‖ (Yin, 
1994).  Furthermore, by using multiple sources of evidence the complexity of the case 
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will be addressed by the collection of converging evidence that triangulates over a given 
fact or hypothesis.   
Variable Operationalization 
Prior to the start of the study, the following variables were expressly defined 
along with the method utilized for data collection.  These variables and methods comprise 
the basis for quantitative evaluation of the proposed hypotheses.   
We first utilize cross-unit coordination to analyze the ability of interdependent 
units to clearly define expectations and problem solve when deviations arise.  We utilize 
the Coordination Assessment, as previously described, as our metric for cross-unit 
coordination.  Since our unit of analysis is the individual, we assess both upstream and 
downstream flow and coordination from each participant‘s perspective.  The first step in 
this process is to identify all interdependent units that may send or receive a product or 
information.  The interdependencies in this study were evaluated in advance of the data 
collection and are shown in Figure 9. 
To evaluate the Coordination Assessment at the individual level, each participant 
was asked a series of survey questions that were tailored to the unit in which they work.  
For example, if a participant worked in the Accessioning area within Anatomic 
Pathology, we tailored the survey to generate questions regarding technical volume (see 
Appendix A and Table 1) and coordination between all of Accessioning‘s interdependent 
units.  First, the participant was asked to estimate the percentage of specimens received 
from all sending units.  The technical volume, or coupling between units, is then 
multiplied by the participant‘s perceived ability to problem solve with the upstream 
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supplier.  All of the upstream connections are added for a total measure of Problem 
Solving with Suppliers.   
Next, the participant was asked to estimate the percentage of specimens sent to all 
downstream units.  The participant was also asked about the perceived ability of these 
downstream units to clearly define and communicate process expectations.  The technical 
volume along each dyad was then multiplied by the participant‘s perceived ability to 
establish and understand the customer‘s requirements.  All of the downstream 
connections are added for a total measure of Clarity of Customer Requirements.   
This overall approach measures the alignment between technical flow and cross-
unit coordination and relies on individual perceptions to quantify the connections, or 
dyads, shown below.  This approach places greater weight on coordination across 
organizational boundaries that have tighter coupling within the system.  To assess overall 
coordination, weighted by interdependence, the Coordination Assessment is calculated by 
averaging the measures of Problem Solving with Suppliers and Clarity of Customer 
Requirements.  This metric represents the perceived ability of each unit in the system to 
clearly communicate and problem solve with other units as they send and receive 
specimens (calculations shown in Figure 8 and visual representation shown in Figure 10).  
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Figure 10: Coordination Assessment Example in AP 
 
While the questions regarding volume and coordination were asked with respect 
to all interdependent units, we also asked some basic documentation questions to gauge if 
errors received from any sending units are documented, noted as the variable Errors 
Documented.  Furthermore, we attempt to understand if the downstream unit‘s 
requirements are documented and easily accessible, which is noted as the variable 
Standard Work Easily Accessible.  These questions (Table 2) were included since they 
may potentially impact the ability of a given unit to coordinate with upstream and 
downstream units, but they are not necessarily specific to each sending or receiving unit. 
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Safety culture and quality are assessed by the individual participant through 
survey.  The safety culture represents the beliefs, attitudes, and values team members 
share about patient safety within the workplace.  Safety culture in our study is assessed 
upon a few common, validated questions within the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire.  
These questions focus on team member training, comfort with problem identification and 
leadership commitment to safety (Table 4) and are identified as the variable Total Safety 
Culture Assessment. 
Quality, while best defined by the stakeholder, is generally a measure of 
excellence or a state of being free from defects or significant variations (Harvey & Green, 
1993).  In healthcare, patient safety refers to the prevention of medical error that leads to 
adverse healthcare events (Shojania et al., 2001).  The Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
considers patient safety ―indistinguishable from the delivery of healthcare.‖    Therefore, 
the term quality in this study is used interchangeably with patient safety and is primarily 
measured by the participant‘s perception of frequency of errors in information and/or 
specimen preparation (Table 3).  This variable is noted as Frequency of Errors. 
Finally, process improvement (PI) efforts are assumed to be an independent 
variable which directly impacts safety culture.  Process improvement efforts in this study 
are defined as the engagement of team members in problem solving within the work unit.  
While the effectiveness of these efforts can vary greatly, the involvement of front-line 
team members in problem identification and problem solving is considered, for purposes 
of this study, to be an important and significant indicator of process improvement.  This 
variable is assessed by the individual and is based upon team member involvement in 
problem solving efforts (Table 5) and is referred to as Strength of PI Initiative.   
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Table 1: Summary of Supplier and Customer-Specific Questions 
Questionnaire Item Scale (5 point) 
S
u
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n
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Problem Solving with 
Suppliers 
If I receive an error** from each of the 
following areas, I would know whom to 
contact to resolve the issue, how to contact 
them, and I would expect an immediate 
response.  (**e.g. paperwork and label 
discrepancy, incomplete patient information, 
missing specimen, poor specimen preparation, 
etc.) 
1 = Strongly Agree to              
5 = Strongly Disagree 
Clarity of Customer 
Requirements 
I have access to information** that states 
exactly how a specimen should be prepared for 
each of the following areas.  (** e.g. Labeling 
requirements, required nuclear detail, label 
placement, how and when to transport, etc.)  
1 = Strongly Agree to                 
5 = Strongly Disagree 
Clarity of Customer 
Requirements 
My area has open and effective communication 
with each of area below regarding how a 
specimen should be prepared and when it 
should arrive. 
1 = Strongly Agree to                
5 = Strongly Disagree 
 
Table 2: Summary of Non Unit-Specific Questions 
Questionnaire Item Scale (5 point) 
D
o
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en
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n
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n
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S
ta
n
d
a
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a
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o
n
 Errors 
Documented 
Errors that are passed to my area are carefully 
documented so that there is a clear record of 
where the error originated, type of error, and 
whether or not it was resolved.   
1 = Strongly Agree to              
5 = Strongly Disagree 
Standard Work 
Easily Accessible 
Documentation stating how to prepare a specimen 
is easy to locate.** (**e.g. Visible from your 
workstation or immediately accessible within 
your workstation.   
1 = Strongly Agree to                 
5 = Strongly Disagree 
 
Table 3: Summary of Quality Questions 
Questionnaire Item Scale (5-6 point) 
Q
u
a
li
ty
  
Error Frequency 
I receive a specimen that has incomplete or 
incorrect paperwork or labeling with the 
following frequency: 
Once Per:  1 = Hour, 2 = 
Day, 3 = Week, 4 = 
Month, 5 = Year, 6 = 
Never 
I receive a specimen that is prepared incorrectly 
with the following frequency: 
1 = Very Likely to                         
5 = Very Unlikely 
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Table 4: Summary of Safety Culture Questions 
Questionnaire Item Scale (5 point) 
S
a
fe
ty
 C
u
lt
u
re
 
Provided 
Necessary 
Information 
I am consistently provided with all the necessary 
information to perform my job. 
1 = Strongly Agree to              
5 = Strongly Disagree 
Encouraged to 
Report Safety 
Concerns 
I am encouraged by management to report any 
patient safety concerns I may have. 
1 = Strongly Agree to              
5 = Strongly Disagree 
Difficulty Asking 
Questions 
It is difficult for employees to ask questions when 
there is something that they do not understand. 
1 = Strongly Agree  to              
5 = Strongly Disagree 
Safety Concerns 
Given Immediate 
Attention 
Every safety concern is given immediate 
attention. 
1 = Strongly Agree to              
5 = Strongly Disagree 
 
Table 5: Summary of Process Improvement Questions 
Questionnaire Item Scale (5 point) 
P
ro
ce
ss
 I
m
p
ro
v
em
en
t 
E
ff
o
rt
s 
Employee 
Involvement 
Involving everyone in continuous improvement is 
a priority within our workplace. 
1 = Strongly Agree to              
5 = Strongly Disagree 
I Have Been 
Actively Involved 
I have played an important role on a team whose 
goal is to improve our process. 
1 = Strongly Agree to              
5 = Strongly Disagree 
 
Surveys were distributed to all team members working within the Anatomic 
Pathology department.  While perceptions of units generating and sending specimens 
were evaluated from a problem solving perspective, these individuals were not included 
within the survey.  In total, surveys were sent to 249 technicians, residents, and 
pathologists located within 16 separate units within Anatomic Pathology.  We received a 
total of 96 responses for a 39% response rate.       
In addition to quantitative survey data, qualitative data was also collected to 
provide greater insight on the implications of cross-unit coordination across 
organizational boundaries.  To provide this context, direct observation was utilized by the 
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researcher to gather information about the networks within Anatomic Pathology.  
Furthermore, open-ended questions were included in the survey (Appendix A).  
Triangulation of the data using the aforementioned methods will deepen our ability to 
understand associations between cross-unit coordination, process improvement efforts, 
safety culture, and quality.   
 
RESULTS 
 
We organize the results in the following sections around the aforementioned 
hypotheses.  We first present the quantitative results and follow with qualitative 
observations and comments.   
Quantitative Results 
The descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables in the study are 
presented in Table 6.  As shown in Table 6, there are significant correlations among all 
variables and safety culture, with the exception of problem solving with suppliers.  The 
rest of the positive correlations stress the importance of estimating the direct effects of 
organization factors (problem solving with suppliers, clarity of customer requirements, 
error documentation, availability of standard work, and process improvement efforts) on 
safety culture.   
Table 7 presents the results of the regression analysis. Model 1 shows the effect of 
several organizational factors on safety culture. The model explains about a third (29.5%) 
of the variation in our sample and the p-value of the F test indicates a good model fit.
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Table 6: Correlations 
CORRELATIONS, MEANS, AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR VARIABLES IN THE STUDY 
  
        
  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 
Coordination 
Assessment 
       
  
2 
Problem 
Solving with 
Suppliers 
0.848 
0.000 
96              
     
  
3 
Clarity of 
Customer 
Requirements 
0.837 
0.000 
96            
0.458 
0.000 
96            
     
  
4 
Errors 
Documented 
0.134 
0.226 
96            
0.095 
0.394 
96            
0.135 
0.225 
96 
    
  
5 
Standard Work 
Easily 
Accessible 
0.403 
***0.000 
96            
0.261 
*0.017 
96 
0.429 
***0.000 
96 
0.249 
*0.023 
96 
   
  
6 
Total 
Frequency of 
Errors 
 -0.148 
0.180 
96 
-0.047 
0.674 
96 
-0.208 
0.059 
98 
-0.014 
0.901 
96 
-0.037 
0.740 
96 
  
  
7 
Total Safety 
Culture 
Assessment 
0.357 
***0.001 
96 
0.175 
0.113 
96 
0.437 
***0.000 
96 
0.240 
*0.029 
96 
0.239 
*0.030 
96 
-0.301 
**0.006 
96 
 
  
8 
Strength of PI 
Initiative 
0.171 
 0.122 
96            
0.101 
0.364 
96 
0.192 
0.081 
96 
0.404 
***0.000  
96 
0.309 
**0.005 
96 
-0.056 
0.616 
96 
0.455 
***0.000 
96   
Mean 1.989 1.856 2.122 2.510 2.698 7.000 2.182 2.203 
Standard Deviation 0.569 0.686 0.664 1.076 1.162 2.031 0.625 0.773 
          
 
− Pearson Correlation 
 
*p < 0.05 
    
 
− P-value 
 
**p < 0.01 
    
 
− N 
 
*** p < 0.001 
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Table 7: Regression Results 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF DIRECT EFFECTS 
 
Variable 
Model 1                   
Safety Culture 
Model 2                     
Quality 
1 
Problem Solving with 
Suppliers 
-0.0325 0.1336 
2 
Clarity of Customer 
Requirements 
     0.3675*** -0.4136 
3 Errors Documented 0.0295 0.0565 
4 
Standard Work Easily 
Accessible 
-0.0272 0.0909 
5 Strength of PI Initiative     0.3093*** 0.2013 
6 
Total Safety Culture 
Assessment 
  -0.9826** 
Adjusted R
2
 29.5% 4.1% 
F 7.86*** 1.58 
Standardized regression coefficients 
  * p < 0.05 
  **p < 0.01 
  ***p < 0.001     
 
Table 7 also contains the coefficient estimates of the regression.  Two variables 
have coefficients significant at the 0.1% level, clarity of customer requirements and 
strength of process improvement initiative.  These results support hypotheses 1b and 2.  
While two variables, errors documented and standard work easily accessible, fall just 
outside 5% significance level, the values are insufficient to support hypotheses 3 and 4.  
Problem solving with suppliers is not close to being significant and the coefficient shows 
a negative sign, indicating that safety culture is weakened with active problem solving.  
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This result disconfirms our hypothesis 1a.  We will return to a possible explanation for 
this result in the discussion section.   
To test for the influence of safety culture, and other organizational factors, on 
quality, we reran the regression including safety culture.  In this regression, Model 2 in 
Table 7, the dependent variable is quality.  The model is a poor fit, explaining only 4% of 
the variation in our sample.  While five of six variables are insignificant, safety culture is 
significant at the 1% level, which supports hypothesis 5.  We know that all the other 
variables, except problem solving with suppliers, are associated with safety culture.  
These insignificant variables likely become intervening variables in the model and show 
their impact on quality through the safety culture variable.  While safety culture is 
significantly associated with quality in this study, the overall model is not significant.  
While the model is likely lacking important variables, we explore other explanations for 
the poor model fit in the discussion section.   
Qualitative Feedback 
Table 8 highlights responses to the open-ended questions in the survey.  Open-
ended feedback was not required, but at least one open-ended response was received in 
81% of the surveys.  While all responses were not included, feedback from each unit was 
reviewed for common themes and the more common responses per unit were included in 
Table 8.  Question numbers refer to the open-ended questions listed in Appendix A. 
What is striking about the qualitative feedback is the difference in responses 
between units, particularly in the case of Cytopathology.  Cytopathology had separately 
been working on a number of process improvement efforts.  There were a total of ten 
responses from the Cytopathology group and they, on average, responded with a µ=1.38 
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(σ = 0.42) score for Strength of PI Effort (on the 5-point Likert scale noted in Table 5).  
This is compared to the remainder of the responses (n = 86) which responded with a 
µ=2.29 (σ = 0.75) score for Strength of PI Effort.   
For example, in response to the question ―Does Error Documentation Prevent 
Future Errors?‖ a team member in Cytology noted the following: ―Sometimes. It depends 
on the type of error and if solutions are able to be implemented by staff within 
Cytopathology.  [I] don't feel able to affect changes outside Cytopathology.‖  The 
following comments were also made by Cytopathology participants: ―We are using lean 
methods to determine root cause and take action to prevent in future,‖ and 
―Standardizing work flow will eliminate errors.‖  This type of qualitative feedback 
provides insights beyond quantitative survey responses and helps us to make sense of the 
data and results in a more meaningful way.  By examining the open ended responses, we 
can begin to understand the variability in problem solving ability, clarity of customer 
requirements, process improvement efforts, and safety culture throughout the Anatomic 
Pathology department.   
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Table 8: Open-Ended Question Responses 
Question Unit (Node) Response 
#5 
Cyto-
pathology 
“Yes, we have an opportunity board to help us label problems we 
have in our lab, and we come up with conclusions on how to fix 
them.” 
#8 Pathologist 
“Many things seem like they have a standard policy but it is 
difficult if not impossible to figure it out (like, for example, how to 
send a specimen to molecular diagnostics for a FISH test).” 
#18 
Cyto-
pathology 
“Increased focus on quality and errors over the last several years 
has helped to improve quality, but there is always a need for 
continuous improvement.  Staff still seem to be very reluctant to 
talk about errors and bring them to the surface. They still seem to 
worry about repercussions and how they will be perceived.” 
#5 Histology 
“If errors are addressed, there's seldom any follow-up between the 
supervisors and the person(s) who originally documented and/or 
committed the error. Hence, the same errors keep happening.” 
#5 Pathologist 
“No, we typically encounter the same labeling errors on GI 
biopsies from [unit X] on a daily basis.”  
#5 Histology 
“I have not seen consistent changes made in an effort to prevent 
certain errors from happening. Almost every day errors are made 
due to lack of communication of expectations to the techs, leading 
to repeated work and longer turn-around times.” 
#3 IPOX 
“In almost all cases, there are multiple players involved with a 
case. Often it is hard to know whether to contact a resident, fellow 
or Pathologist in charge for any specific case.  It usually takes at 
least two phone calls (often more) to resolve a question.” 
#24 Histology 
“There tends to be a disconnect between what the employees 
understand and what management understands. I have pointed out 
what I thought were primary issues to be told it is a symptom of a 
bigger problem that will be dealt with later. Given that, and not a 
fuller explanation, I leave off pointing out any more problems since 
I don't understand the bigger picture.” 
#3 
Central 
Distribution 
“It can be difficult to resolve a problem when you are going from 
person to person trying to figure it out and each person gives you a 
different place to try or just says it’s not theirs.” 
#30 
Hemato- 
pathology 
“Improvement processes should involve everyone. We are a team, 
but only the team leaders decide.” 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Interpretation of Results 
While the regression analysis in Model 1 confirmed a reasonably good fit, the 
results for problem solving with suppliers warrant further scrutiny.  We believe the 
reason why the coefficient for this variable does not exhibit stronger significance lies in 
the truncation of the data.  Either the question utilized to gauge problem solving ability 
was misleading or a lack of problem solving across organizational boundaries impaired 
participant‘s ability to accurately answer the question.   
The qualitative responses, particularly within Cytopathology, help us to 
understand the quantitative results.  While Cytopathology had a number of responses that 
suggested that they utilize structured problem solving within their unit, there were several 
comments to suggest that coordinating and problem solving with other units was difficult.  
These comments were present in open-ended questions throughout the study and were 
also apparent in direct observations of the laboratory.  Cytopathology team members 
were more likely to note weaker problem solving capability across boundaries.  Other 
units responded to the problem solving question positively but made comments that 
suggested there is ineffective problem solving between units.  We list a few of these 
contradictory responses in Table 9.  A problem solving value of 1 denotes that the 
respondent strongly agreed that they knew who to contact at each supplier in the event of 
an error, and the respondent could also expect an immediate response.  For each 
respondent we list both the problem solving value, calculated as an average for all 
suppliers, and one of their open-ended responses.   
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Table 9: Respondent Problem Solving Values and Associated Comments 
Respondent
Unit (Node) 
Problem 
Solving 
Value 
Comment 
Pathologist 1 
“We typically encounter the same labeling errors on GI biopsies 
from [Unit X] on a daily basis.   
Hemato-
pathology 
2 
“I am not, nor are my coworkers, completely clear on what to do if 
there is a problem.” 
Histology 1 
“If errors are addressed, there’s seldom any follow-up between the 
supervisors and the person who documented or committed the 
error.  Hence, the same errors keep happening.”  
Histology 1.3 
“I have not seen consistent changes made in an effort to prevent 
certain errors from happening.” 
Pathologist 1.4 
“Errors are discussed during meetings, and then lab policy is 
changed to prevent future occurrences.” 
Hemato-
pathology 
2 
“I have never been informed who the contact person is if I receive 
an error from [Unit X] or [Unit Y].  Contact information should be 
readily available.” 
 
 The results in Table 9 suggest that the problem solving variable was truncated and 
therefore skewed our ability to accurately determine its impact on safety culture and 
quality.  It is apparent that either the question regarding problem solving capability was 
misleading or our respondents overestimated their ability to problem solve with suppliers.  
In either case, the open-ended comments suggest that there is an inability to problem 
solve with suppliers and implement countermeasures.  While one would suspect that 
problem solving with suppliers would contribute to safety culture and quality, the current 
study showcases the difficulty in effectively capturing problem solving ability, and its 
implications, in healthcare.  While problem solving with suppliers did not prove to be a 
significant variable in our study, Model 1 did prove to be a good fit when predicting 
8
7
 
 
87 
 
safety culture.  While organizational factors such as error documentation and availability 
of standard work fell just outside the 5% significance level, clarity of customer 
requirements and process improvement efforts significantly contributed to a unit‘s overall 
safety culture.   
 While we believe that the truncation of the problem solving variable impaired its 
contribution to both models, the lack of contribution from the other variables on quality 
may be explained by their intervening impact on safety culture.  Furthermore, their 
overall affect may be lessened by the way quality was calculated.  Quality, in this study, 
was calculated as the perceived frequency of paperwork and specimen errors.  This 
variable is therefore perceptions of quality and not actual quality, or frequency of error.  
Variables such as error documentation and process improvement efforts may actually 
make the respondent more aware of errors that are otherwise overlooked or quickly 
passed along to a supervisor.  In this case, perception of error may actually increase with 
error documentation and process improvement efforts.  The lack of fit within Model 2 
suggests that our methods for estimating error frequency may have impacted our 
understanding of organizational contributors to quality.  Additionally, while there are 
likely several variables missing that contribute to quality, problem solving with suppliers, 
when captured appropriately, should theoretically improve both safety culture and 
quality.  While Model 2 was not a good fit when predicting quality, we were able to 
confirm the association between safety culture and quality.   
Managerial Implications 
While our analysis is based on one case study within an Anatomic Pathology 
department, we believe it allows for certain generalizations, especially within healthcare, 
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but potentially to other complex environments such as advanced product development 
and research and design.  First, the significance of clear customer requirements on safety 
culture suggests there is value in the approach of aligning technical flow with cross-unit 
coordination (or the safety control network).  The inability of the problem solving 
component to associate with any other variable suggests that either there is truly no 
correlation with safety culture, or participants in the study were unfamiliar with effective 
problem solving and had difficulty answering the questions in a meaningful way.  Based 
on the literature review, direct observation, and open-ended comments we believe the 
issue was the latter.  Second, the study supports a relationship between safety culture and 
quality.   
In addition to the importance of clarity of customer requirements, safety culture is 
significantly impacted by process improvement efforts.  Based on these findings, we 
better understand the importance of coordination and process improvement within and 
across organizational boundaries.  Leadership must work to foster this type of culture 
within departmental boundaries and with leadership outside of the department.  By 
calculating the coordination assessment, leadership can begin to understand how each 
department can improve as both a customer and supplier.  All the variables in the study, 
work together to create more aware and responsive units that are capable of identifying 
problems and testing countermeasures that will improve safety culture and quality 
throughout the system.  Each variable in the study requires leadership that can enable 
structured problem solving and process improvement by all team members.  Model 1 
shows that improvement of several organizational factors can improve safety culture.  
Furthermore, Model 2 shows the impact of safety culture on quality. By improving upon 
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these variables within each unit, and coordinating across organizational boundaries for 
improved error identification and problem solving, leaders can simultaneously improve 
both safety culture and quality within the organization. 
Limitations and Future Work 
The largest limitations in this study stem from the availability of data.  While 
utilizing the individual as the unit of analysis allowed us to avoid ecological and 
exception errors in reasoning and was necessary given the data, it is also the largest 
limitation of the study.  Ideally, the unit of analysis would be the dyad, as the aim of the 
study is to determine the effectiveness of coordination efforts along these connections 
and their implications on quality throughout the system.  If the unit of analysis were the 
dyad, though, we would have to find some way to capture error frequency across these 
connections.  This data is not available at a unit-level, let alone the dyad-level.  
Variability in error reporting and collection within healthcare makes it difficult to assess 
associations using actual quality data.  Given the propositions within this study, we 
believe that accurate collection of quality data will be difficult without cross-unit 
coordination, which is the very association we are looking to test.  This is an area of 
opportunity for future research.   
This study also highlighted the difficulty in assessing problem-solving capabilities 
with upstream suppliers.  This may be due to cultural difficulties in error disclosure in 
healthcare or it may be due to varied perceptions of what effective problem solving 
means.  There is a need in this area of research to construct a study that is able to both 
document errors and test for problem-solving ability across boundaries within healthcare.   
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 The last, and arguably most important, aspect of this research for further 
examination is the ability of leaders and healthcare practitioners to apply these findings 
within their departments and health systems to enable problem solving and system-wide 
improvement.  The next paper will describe one health system‘s efforts to utilize 
iterative, cross-unit improvements to improve patient safety.
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CHAPTER IV:  TRANSFORMING COMPLEX VALUE STREAMS IN 
HEALTHCARE: AN ORGANIC APPROACH TO SYSTEM-WIDE PATIENT 
SAFETY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As news regarding errors and quality in healthcare continues to grow, many 
healthcare organizations have started some type of formal process improvement program 
to proactively address mounting patient safety concerns.  Depending on the unique 
situation, these process improvement efforts may be initiated by those who do the work, 
by hospital administration, or by the government (Vincent, 2003; Iedema, Jorm, Long, 
Braithwaite, Travaglia, & Westbrook, 2006).  If hospital administration believes that a 
process has the potential for preventable medical errors, they may initiate a process 
improvement effort from the top-down.  In this case, the individuals who deliver the care 
may or may not understand the motivation for initiating the process improvement.  If a 
reportable medical error occurs, government agencies such as The Joint Commission may 
initiate the improvement effort from the outside-in by requiring a standard root-cause 
analysis with a corresponding action plan for preventing similar errors from occurring in 
the future.  Depending on how the error is communicated, who is included, and how the 
root cause analysis is performed, the care givers involved may have varying degrees of 
engagement in the highly formalized process improvement effort (Wald & Shojania, 
9
2
 
 
92 
 
2001).  With mounting evidence that the causes of preventable errors are pervasive and 
need to be worked on daily through continuous improvement, more progressive hospitals 
have worked to create a culture of process improvement from the bottom-up by engaging 
all team members throughout the system (Liker & Franz, 2011).  In this case, the 
individuals who are closest to the work are trained and led by their group leaders to 
systematically identify and solve problems that can lead to errors.   
The way in which a process improvement effort is initiated can impact the way in 
which leadership and team members engage in the initiative and can subsequently impact 
the long-term sustainability of the process improvement effort (Frankel, Leonard, & 
Denham, 2006).  While some patient safety improvement efforts occur within the 
boundaries of one segment of an organization and fall under one leader‘s span of control, 
the complexity of the healthcare delivery process often requires participation from 
interdependent yet semiautonomous departments to adequately address the patient safety 
concern.  Therefore, the way team members engage in process improvement efforts in 
one department does not necessarily correspond with engagement in other departments.  
It is in this respect that improving patient safety across the complex healthcare 
organization becomes extremely challenging, particularly if limited to bottom-up efforts 
within units.   
This chapter will seek to understand how multiple units collectively engage in a 
system-wide patient safety initiative.  Unlike patient safety initiatives that can be 
addressed and improved within a singular unit, this case study will examine the ability to 
quickly transfer patients requiring intensive care into the Intensive Care Unit (ICU).  
While this is not a metric regularly monitored in health care, the speed or lead-time with 
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which patients in need of intensive care receive ICU-level care has been shown to 
directly impact patient mortality.  One study showed that patients who were transferred 
from an inpatient unit to the ICU more than four hours after a marker of clinical 
instability was noted, had a nearly five-fold higher adjusted risk of death than patients 
transferred earlier (Young, Gooder, McBride, James, & Fisher, 2003).  Similarly, a study 
of delays in transfer from the Emergency Department (ED) to the ICU found that patients 
who waited more than six hours in the ED had significantly increased hospital length of 
stays, higher intensive care unit mortality, and higher hospital mortality (Chalfin, 
Trzeciak, Likourezos, Baumann, & Dellinger, 2007). While additional studies have noted 
the time-critical nature of ICU care for acutely ill patients (Rapoport, Teres, Lemeshow, 
& Harris, 1990; Duke, Green, & Briedis, 2004), even more have identified the increase in 
mortality and error associated with holding these patients in the ED (Trzeciak & Rivers, 
2003; Cowan & Trzeciak, 2004; Richardson, 2006; Liu, Thomas, Gordon, Hamedani, & 
Weissman, 2009).  According to Kaboli & Rosenthal (2003):   
 ―While the importance of eliminating delays in transporting 
patients to the hospital for certain conditions has received a great deal of 
public attention, it is perhaps ironic that little attention has focused on 
delays in transferring patients already in the hospital to an ICU that may 
be just down the hall.‖ 
Patient movement to the ICU requires coordination between the sending 
department and the ICU.  If there aren‘t any ICU beds available, additional departments 
may be utilized to board the most stable ICU patients, making room for higher acuity 
patients.  In these cases, several departments are required to coordinate multiple patient 
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moves to get the clinically unstable patient critical care as soon as possible.  The case 
study presented in this chapter will analyze one approach to engaging departments across 
the system in an effort to reduce the time from patient admission in the ED to arrival in 
the ICU.   
The patient safety effort under study began in earnest after an unfortunate, and 
likely preventable, adverse event occurred.  Leadership of the ED and the ICU 
departments decided something had to change and subsequently initiated a process 
improvement effort to prevent similar events from occurring in the future.  This case 
study will examine their organic, team member-driven effort to improve patient safety.  
Their effort initially focused on the process for patient transfer between their two units 
and was later iteratively extended across the system to improve overall coordination and 
responsiveness to patient needs.  While organic and mechanistic approaches to 
organization-wide process improvement have been studied at a macro-level in other 
industries (Kucner, 2008), this chapter will seek to understand how these approaches to 
process improvement impact a system-wide patient safety effort that spans several 
interdependent, yet semiautonomous departments.   
Specifically, we look to understand how the approach to improvement is 
translated across organizational boundaries.  Coordination across these boundaries will be 
defined by the ability to perform frequent and structured problem solving while 
maintaining the flexibility to quickly adapt to patient needs.  Cross-departmental 
coordination is examined as the patient safety improvement effort is extended across the 
system.  Perceptions regarding the ability to coordinate care and problem solve to achieve 
a shared patient safety goal are captured through periodic, semi-structured interviews 
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with leaders throughout the organization.  The research methods include interviews and 
participant observation longitudinally in a real intervention to reduce patient transfer 
time. 
Approaches to Improvement: Mechanistic vs. Organic 
The terms mechanistic and organic were first described in 1961 (Burns & Stalker, 
1994) in a study contrasting how different organizational structures fit within varying 
external environments.  In a mechanistic structure, tasks and responsibilities are rigid and 
well-defined.  In an organic structure, tasks are continuously refined and responsibilities 
are often shared and established in teams.  In mechanistic organizations, communication 
tends to be vertical, whereas in organic organizations there is more lateral communication 
through informal networks.  According to Burns and Stalker, mechanistic structures are 
better suited to a stable operating environment while organic structures are better suited 
to a dynamic or uncertain environment.  The term mechanistic implies that the 
organizational structure and underlying processes are like a machine, in which each part 
plays a specific role and a given input will produce an expected output.  The term 
organic, on the other hand, implies that the organizational structure is much like an 
organism which is able to adapt and learn in response to a changing environment.  In 
their studies, Burns and Stalker used these terms to refer to the overarching 
organizational structure.  Over time, this theory has been extended to describe more 
localized department structures (Daft, 2004) and more recently varying approaches to the 
deployment of lean management systems (Kucner, 2008).  In this paper, we further 
extend these concepts to understand how a hybrid mechanistic and organic approach to a 
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singular process improvement effort impacts coordination and improvement across the 
organization.    
While the mechanistic and organic concepts represent almost opposing 
approaches to organizing, Burn‘s and Stalker‘s work noted that there wasn‘t one best 
approach.  Instead, these approaches lie on a continuum and the best approach will be 
unique to each organization and will be contingent on both internal and external 
environmental factors which may change over time.  This concept of contingency theory 
emerged in several areas of organizational theory in the late 1960s as organizations 
became increasingly viewed as open systems that strive for a goodness of fit between 
internal needs and the external environment (Morgan, 2006).  There are advantages, 
depending on the situation, to both mechanistic and organic approaches to process 
improvement.  For example, the structure of mechanistic approaches can provide a better 
infrastructure for long-term sustainability of the initiative whereas an organic approach 
allows for adaptation and learning throughout the improvement process (Kucner, 2008).  
While there can be advantages to each approach, there is often a best fit that combines 
elements of each that meets the needs of the environment and organizational goals. Adler 
(Adler & Borys, 1996) observed a Toyota run manufacturing plant and found a hybrid 
that he called enabling bureaucracy, as opposed to coercive bureaucracy.  A coercive 
bureaucracy will create fixed routines and procedures that in turn create rigid and static 
processes.  On the other hand, an enabling bureaucracy will utilize meta-routines 
(routines for changing routines) to continuously improve and adapt processes to meet 
changing needs.  The Toyota Production System exemplifies enabling bureaucracy 
(Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999) and is the model for lean management. 
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Approach to Improvement and Organizational Learning 
Often the approach to an organization‘s strategy, a new initiative, or even a small 
improvement, is a result of the motivation for change and the organization‘s culture and 
is less often a formal plan by leadership.  Ideally, leadership would tailor the approach to 
process improvement to achieve a goodness of fit between the organization‘s needs and 
the external environment.  The first step in this process, which is fundamental but easily 
taken for granted, is to clearly define the goal.  People are more often motivated by a 
positive vision than by a localized objective with no apparent purpose (Liker & Franz, 
2011).  The way in which this goal is established may influence leadership, and 
ultimately team member engagement in the initiative.  The approach to improvement 
utilized by leadership can shape the problem solving and learning experience for those 
closest to the work.  Unless the people in the process are supported to learn a new way of 
thinking and are taught skills to enable them to improve the process themselves, it will be 
a short-lived improvement to the process (Liker & Franz, 2011). 
Toyota is an example of an organization that has continually practiced problem 
solving at all levels to enable learning and system-wide improvement.  Problem solving 
occurs throughout Toyota through the use of PDCA, or plan-do-check-adjust.
1
  PDCA is 
the basis of problem solving taught by Walter Shewhart at Bell Laboratories which 
utilizes a methodical approach to defining, understanding, and solving problems.  While 
the concept was adopted by many organizations, few have been as successful as Toyota 
in fully utilizing the power of PDCA.  While subtle, there are important differences in 
                                                 
1
 This is more often referred to as plan-do-check-ACT.   Liker and Franz (2011) 
prefer ―adjust‖ because it implies a more dynamic learning process based on the check 
step. 
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approach that differentiate high performing organizations from the others.  A mechanistic 
approach to utilizing PDCA for problem solving would follow rigid steps which may 
include data collection, statistical analysis, and creation of countermeasures based on the 
data.  If the process did not achieve the desired result, adjustments may be made, but 
another full cycle of PDCA would be unlikely.  This type of problem solving does not 
foster the culture necessary to become a learning organization.  An improvement would 
be made and the team would move on to a completely new issue.  An organic approach to 
PDCA, on the other hand, would be continually performed by those doing the work in a 
sincere effort to both improve and learn.  Problem solving in the organic case becomes a 
way of thinking and eventually becomes a habit that is extended across all levels of the 
organization.  This process requires a great deal of time and patience from leadership 
with a focus on long-term goals for organizational learning and people development. 
As problem solving occurs organically, new ideas and processes are translated 
willingly throughout the organization.  When driven by mechanistic means, problem 
solving that occurs in one area is directed by management to be replicated in other areas 
of the organization.  This mechanistic sharing of learning is often referred to as ―sharing 
best practice‖ or identifying pre-existing solutions for quick wins.  The process that 
worked well in one department or organization is expected to be adopted in other areas 
with little to no regard for the goodness of fit with the unique external environment and 
internal needs.  The Japanese refer to the organic sharing of learning across the system as 
yokoten, which means that the environment must be considered before adopting a new 
practice, or the idea is not likely to succeed (Liker & Franz, 2011).  The ability to tie 
improvement efforts across fundamentally different departments or units, therefore, 
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requires a great deal of thoughtfulness, testing, and adjustment to iteratively move 
towards systemic improvement. 
Design Elements for Iterative Improvement 
When processes require the coordination of many interdependent units, problem 
solving and learning across organizational boundaries is necessary to tie improvements 
across an organization.  Yokoten, therefore, requires contextual considerations and 
problem solving from not just one department but by both departments coordinating to 
improve the delivery of a service or product.  For example, Figure 11 below represents 
four interdependent units within a system.  In order to improve the overall delivery of a 
service or product, improvements must be made both within and across organizational 
boundaries.  If Unit A and Unit B utilize PDCA cycles to improve coordination across 
connection #1, Unit C and Unit D may be able to utilize learning from A and B to 
improve connection # 4.  Though, in order to achieve a goodness of fit, the unique needs 
of Departments C and D must be considered.  Therefore, Units C and D must be able to 
perform structured problem solving and adjustment to understand how to best improve 
coordination between their units.   
 
Figure 11: Interdependence and Cross-Unit Connections 
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The ability of a system to coordinate, learn, and improve across multiple, 
interdependent units can improve both flexibility and whole-system functioning.  When 
the complex value stream is mapped and the interdependencies between units are 
understood by leadership, the team can determine together where problems exist 
throughout the system.  Problems, in the PDCA way of thinking, are gaps between the 
ideal and actual condition.  Once these connections are mapped and understood by the 
team, leadership can utilize their vision of the improved state to determine where the gaps 
exist.  The thoughtful analysis of each connection in the system can be a good starting 
place for yokoten.  Starting improvement efforts on connections furthest from the ideal is 
a good way to utilize vision and organic motivation to engage leadership and team 
members in continuous problem solving with a purpose.  As these connections improve, 
learning is shared with other leaders as a basis for problem solving and iterative and 
cross-unit improvement.   
Requisite Variety 
In complex systems like healthcare, flexibility is critical to meeting unexpected 
demands while maintaining quality and patient safety.  While some leaders may think 
that reducing interdependencies would improve clarity and overall coordination across a 
system, it can drastically reduce resilience and the flexibility necessary to respond to 
urgent, unforeseen patient needs.  Resilience is the ability of systems to quickly and 
effectively respond to unforeseen, unpredicted, and unexpected demands and to resume 
or continue normal operations (Nemeth, Wears, Woods, Hollnagel, & Cook).  In complex 
systems such as healthcare delivery, the challenge lies in improving coordination and 
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problem solving across all of the interdependent connections necessary to bring a product 
or service to fruition.  Process variety and flexibility allows the organization to discover 
adaptive responses, which become another avenue for organizational learning.  Weick 
suggests that there is a requisite amount of variety that complex organizations must 
maintain to respond to disruptions with the appropriate degree of sensitivity (Weick, 
2001).  Like an organism, the organization must adapt to its environment and evolve in 
order to survive.   
Process complexity and interdependencies have the ability to improve adaptability 
and flexibility across the entire system.  Process variety and interdependencies, though, 
are only advantageous when the system can adequately coordinate and improve these 
connections over time.   
Structured and Self-Diagnostic Communication 
From a problem solving perspective, one positive aspect of a mechanistic 
organizational structure is the clarity of processes and tasks.  A certain input will 
generally produce a certain output.  This consistency and clarity can help to facilitate 
problem solving since deviations are more easily identified.  The metaphor of 
organizations as machines is largely based on the concept that departments within an 
organization, like parts within a machine, can be structurally modified to produce a 
different result.  However, many products and services today are far too complex for any 
one individual to understand and improve from a systematic level.  Therefore, one 
individual or team can‘t simply modify one component of a system to significantly 
change the output.     
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Due to the complexity of the system, it is the structured and self-diagnostic nature 
of the connections between units that improves problem solving and, ultimately, system-
wide improvement.  The clarity of requirements and ability to problem solve between 
internal customers and suppliers lays the foundation for incremental and systematic 
organizational improvements.  These structural qualities of the system improve the ability 
of team members within the organization to perform scientific experiments and 
continuously improve.  Spear (1999) observed that these principles and design elements 
were common across functional roles and hierarchical levels within areas of Toyota that 
were governed by the Toyota Production System (TPS).  He termed these principles the 
―Rules-in-Use‖ which allow organizations and workers to problem solve and continually 
improve.  TPS-managed organizations design the connections among people and 
activities to be ―specified-in-their-design, tested-with-their-every-use, and improved 
close in time, place, and person to the occurrence of every problem‖ (Johnston & Spear, 
2001).  Structured and self-diagnostic connections improve the ability of the organization 
to learn through broad-based, frequent problem solving.   
In this work we will examine both the advantages and disadvantages of the 
approach taken by leadership in one patient safety effort, how this approach changed as 
the initiative grew, and how the approach was perceived by various departments as 
improvement efforts were iteratively extended across the system.  Furthermore, we will 
examine how approach to improvement affects the ability of the system to spread 
problem solving and process improvement across the interdependent, yet 
semiautonomous departments within a complex system.  Specifically, we examine the 
ability of departments to utilize inherent complexity to improve responsiveness to urgent 
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and unpredictable patient needs by problem solving across multiple organizational 
boundaries through structured and self-diagnostic communication.   
DATA AND METHODS 
 
This chapter will utilize an embedded, single case study design to examine how 
an organic approach to process improvement utilized structured problem solving and 
requisite variety to iteratively tie patient safety efforts across the system.  Using an 
interpretive perspective, we analyze how leadership‘s approach to process improvement 
across organizational boundaries influences the ability to coordinate patient safety efforts 
across the complex health system.   
Research Methods 
The embedded, single case study design was utilized to follow one health 
system‘s effort to reduce the time it takes to get a critical patient appropriate medical 
care.  The patient safety initiative was monitored over the course of ten months.  A case 
study approach is ideal for a longitudinal study of change (Yin, 2009), and the embedded 
design allowed for deeper analysis within and between departments as the initiative was 
iteratively extended across the health system.  The unit of analysis in this study is the 
cross-unit connection, or dyad, between departments.  Findings from these connections 
are triangulated with multiple sources of data including interviews, participant 
observation, and quantitative process data to improve the credibility of data interpretation 
(Hansen, 2006).  In addition to the multiple sources of data, the longitudinal, embedded 
case provides a unique opportunity to present a rich description of an organizational 
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change nuanced by both time and contextual factors (Pettigrew, Woodman, & Cameron, 
2001).  This rich data set provided the context necessary to study how improvement 
efforts are extended across the complex organization.   
Interviews 
Eighteen semi-structured interviews were conducted over the course of five 
months, from May to September 2010.  The open semi-structured format allows for a 
focused, yet exploratory conversation.  While a questionnaire framework was prepared in 
advance (Appendix B), the majority of the questions were adapted during the interview, 
allowing the conversation to naturally probe for additional details and deeper 
understanding.   The interviews focused on three main areas: understanding of the 
process for moving ICU patients to or from each unit, communication between the 
various units during patient movement, and problem identification and resolution.  
Interviews averaged about thirty minutes, and each was recorded and subsequently 
transcribed with the consent of the participant.  Interview participants included 
physicians, nurse leaders, and nurses from across the system.  Interviews were conducted 
with individuals from the Emergency Department, each ICU, bed coordination, the 
Department of Medicine, and the inpatient nursing units.         
Participant Observation 
Throughout this initiative, I was employed at the health system under study with 
primary focus on patient flow and throughput across the system.  While I worked closely 
with the leaders who were spearheading the initiative, I was not providing direct support 
or guidance throughout the initiative.  This unique perspective allowed me to closely 
1
0
5
 
 
105 
 
follow the progress of the initiative without being biased by personal goals or setbacks 
throughout the process.  Observations were documented as field notes.  In addition to 
personal field notes, weekly meeting minutes were collected to track the team‘s 
discussion of the effort over the course of the study.  
Process Metrics 
Quantitative process metrics were captured throughout the initiative to monitor 
patient delays to the ICU.  Since the effort was initiated by the Emergency Department 
(ED) and the Medical Intensive Care Unit (MICU), the first metric collected was the total 
time between hospital admission in the ED to the time the patient was transferred to the 
MICU.  As additional ICUs were incorporated into the initiative, similar metrics were 
tracked as patients were transferred to each unit from the ED.  In each case, baseline data 
was collected and transfer times were tracked daily over the course of ten months.   
 
RESEARCH SETTING AND BACKGROUND 
 
The process for getting an ICU patient into a critical care setting can be difficult.  
Depending on the severity of the patient, the ability of the system to coordinate adaptive 
responses between departments is extremely time sensitive and critical to patient 
outcomes.  The first step in the process is identifying that a patient requires ICU-level 
care.  While certain patient needs are immediately obvious, others may not be.  The 
clinical parameters that signal a need for more intensive medical care may or may not be 
immediately visible. 
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Once a provider has identified that a patient requires the ICU, the provider or care 
giver must notify the appropriate ICU of the patient‘s condition and needs.  Some health 
systems have one ICU while others have several specialized ICUs.  The hospital under 
study has Medical Intensive Care Unit (MICU), a Surgical Intensive Care Unit (SICU), a 
Cardio-Thoracic Intensive Care Unit (CTICU), and a step-down (less intensive) ICU 
referred to as Medical Assessment and Treatment (MAT).   
Depending on critical care demand and ICU capacity, there may or may not be a 
bed available in the appropriate ICU.  If a bed is available, the sending provider must 
contact the appropriate receiving provider as soon as possible to perform a safe and 
timely handoff of patient information.  If a bed is not available, a series of patient moves 
must be coordinated to get the acutely ill patient immediate critical care.  While patient 
transfers are usually managed by a centralized ―bed coordination‖ unit, the patient 
movement from the ED to the ICU and between ICUs is coordinated between physicians 
and nursing based on patient severity.  Due to capacity constraints, care givers in the ICU 
want to ensure the patient is appropriate for ICU-level care.  Additionally, understanding 
patient severity and specific needs will help care givers in the ICUs determine which unit 
is appropriate.  Depending on the individual needs of the patient, the severity of the other 
ICU patients, and overall hospital census, care givers in the ICU may have to engage 
several departments, as shown in Figure 12, in an attempt to coordinate patient moves to 
best meet the needs of all patients. 
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Figure 12: ICU Patient Flow Network 
 
Aside from capacity constraints and logistical complexity, patient moves can be a 
difficult task to accomplish for several other reasons.  In the following section, excerpts 
from interviews will provide background on some of the underlying cultural barriers to 
coordinating critical patient moves between the ED, ICUs, and inpatient units.   
Cultural Barriers to Coordinating Critical Care 
Each department within the health system is like a microcosm.  While operating 
within the same organization, each unit has its own norms and expectations for patient 
care.  “Patients that come up here [from another unit] don't seem to be given the same 
sort of care that we would provide.” [ICU Nurse]  Over time, these differences in 
expectations can create cultural barriers between departments within the same 
organization.  These differences combined with the urgency of patient moves and the 
pressure of capacity constraints can create tension between departments.  “It's medicine 
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versus surgery versus the ICU.  I've never seen such a turf war before over beds.” [ED 
Nurse Manager]   
Historic problems between units, both real and perceived, can diminish trust 
across organizational boundaries.  “We've had some communication issues with charge 
nurse calling every ten, twenty minutes, almost accusatory, like we're not moving the 
patients fast enough.  Where I think, we've been moving as fast as we can.”  [ICU Nurse]  
These problems can occasionally manifest in contemptuous responses to requests for 
patient moves. “It's always difficult to get anybody to answer you on the floor.  It's 
frustrating, but it's also something we've come to expect.” [ICU Nurse]   These tensions 
between units can make problem solving and process improvement difficult.  “The nurse 
managers can be very defensive about their nurses.  We don't take our nurses being 
criticized too easily and we become very defensive and we can't have open 
communication.” [Inpatient Unit Nurse Manager] 
In addition to the tension between units, providers may have patient safety 
concerns with taking a patient off their clinical specialty.  Certain physicians may refuse 
that their patient be transferred into an off-service (or off-specialty) ICU.  Additionally, 
certain physicians may have varying expectations on what type of patients they are 
willing to accept in their ICUs.  When these requirements are not explicit, tension can 
arise when trying to coordinate patient moves.  “It's not written anywhere that I know of.  
But we don't want to take anyone that is on any kind of precautions.  We only have four 
isolation rooms in our unit.  So, we won't take anyone, because our patients are fresh 
post-op, that's on precautions or an unexplained elevated white count or temperature.” 
[ICU Nurse]   
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Finally, it can be difficult to determine how to best coordinate patients when you 
are unsure of what type of patient will need care next.  Furthermore, no one unit has the 
whole-system perspective.  “I think it's a system issue.  The only way that you can have 
space in your ICU to accept a patient from the ED or from the floor is by having space 
somewhere else in the hospital to move your patient to.” [Hospitalist]  Without real-time, 
system-wide metrics that every department is seeing, it is difficult to prioritize patient 
moves and decisions.  “For the longest time, the squeaky wheel was the ED.  And the ED 
would always get the beds first, even if it didn’t make sense.” [ICU Nurse] 
Historic cultural barriers between units can make timely transfer of critical care 
patients difficult.  Each department or unit works largely within a silo.  These 
interdependent, yet semiautonomous units strive to provide the best care for their 
patients, without necessarily understanding the needs of patients in other units.  
“Everybody thinks their unit has the right answers.  Everybody has this ethnocentric kind 
of thing going on where they can't appreciate the bigger picture.” [ICU Nurse]  In the 
case of critical care, delays have direct and negative implications for patient safety.  The 
impact of delays on patient safety became apparent to the health system under study 
when two sentinel events occurred within the same month as a result of delayed critical 
care.  These events became the motivation for change.   
Motivation and Approach to Change 
In the same month, two sentinel events occurred as patients waited to receive 
critical care.  One patient decompensated while on an inpatient medical floor, but all ICU 
beds were occupied and the necessary patient moves were not accomplished in the time 
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needed to open a bed for the critical patient.  In the other case, a patient waited in the 
Emergency Department for a medical ICU bed to become available.  In this case, the 
ideal ICU bed was not available, but there was availability in another, off-service ICU.  
The urgency of the situation and overall bed occupancy was not fully understood by 
leadership in all areas and the move was not coordinated quickly enough for the patient to 
receive the necessary critical care.  The motivation for change came from the leaders in 
the Medical ICU (MICU) and the Emergency Department (ED).  Their deep desire to 
change both the process and culture to prevent similar events from happening in the 
future became the catalyst for organic, widespread improvements for patient safety.  
Phase I: The Burning Platform (May - June 2010)  
The leaders began their effort to reduce delays to critical care by evaluating the 
cross-unit connections between departments.  The most utilized connection for ICU 
patient flow is between the Emergency Department (ED) and the Medical Intensive Care 
Unit (MICU).  This was a logical starting point for the improvement effort due to the 
volume of patient transfers between the ED and MICU and a lack of communication and 
coordination.  In this respect, the current state of the process for patient movement was 
furthest from the ideal.  Furthermore, it required the coordination of both leaders actively 
engaged in leading the initiative.   
Data was collected to determine the current effectiveness of the process for 
patient movement between the ED and the MICU.  Prior to establishing a new process, 
the average time from admission in the ED to arrival in the MICU was 270 minutes.  The 
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average lead time took four and a half hours for the sickest and most acutely ill patients 
in the hospital to get to the Intensive Care Unit after admission in the ED.   
The leaders started the improvement initiative by engaging team members in each 
area to develop a standard process for ED providers and nurses to communicate the need 
for a patient move into the MICU.  The team‘s goal was to create a process that was 
capable of transferring a patient to the ICU within 100 minutes of admission in the ED.   
All team members agreed that the variety of processes for communication between the 
ED and the MICU made timely transfer difficult.  The team focused on creating a 
singular, standard line of communication.  The first call from the ED provider would go 
to the Department of Medicine, since the hospitalist would be assuming care of the 
patient.  A singular number was created that one hospitalist carried at all times.  Once the 
hospitalist was contacted, they would review the patient‘s information to determine the 
most appropriate unit for transfer.  They could downgrade the patient if they felt the 
patient was stable enough to move to an inpatient nursing unit (―floor‖), they could send 
the patient to the Medical Assessment and Treatment Unit (MAT) if the patient needed 
moderately intensive critical care, or they could send the patient to the MICU if 
immediate intensive care was required.  If the patient required the MAT or the MICU, the 
hospitalist would contact a singular critical care nurse to coordinate the logistics of the 
patient move.  This critical care nurse is referred to as the ―ENIT‖ nurse, which stands for 
Emergency Nursing Intervention Team.  If a bed is available, the ENIT nurse would 
physically go to the ED to move the patient into the MAT or MICU.  If a bed is not 
available, the ENIT nurse would convey that information to the hospitalist and would 
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then attempt to coordinate moving another, more stable, patient to another ICU or 
inpatient floor.   
The process was implemented and had moderate success in the first few weeks.  
Transfer times were improving but were not meeting the goal established by the team.  
The team uncovered multiple issues throughout the process.  As issues arose, 
countermeasures were established, and the process was tested again to see if they were 
effective.  Throughout this phase the team adopted the use of logbooks to log the time 
either the hospitalist or ENIT nurse were contacted.  When the patient was transferred to 
the ICU, leaders could check to see if they met their goal.  If they did not meet their goal 
because of a preventable delay in the process, the reason for delay was documented, and 
the issue would be escalated to senior leadership for support and problem solving if 
necessary.     
By the end of this phase, the time to transfer a patient between the ED and the 
MICU and MAT had dropped to an average of 120 minutes.  This was a 55% reduction in 
lead time, but it still did not meet the goal set by the team.  Throughout these first few 
months, the MICU was often at full capacity and several patient moves were being 
coordinated in order to move one patient into the unit.  The team decided that they would 
try to keep one bed available at all times to reduce the delays for the most critically ill.  In 
order to keep one bed available, providers had to be more proactive in identifying stable 
patients that could be moved to either the MAT or the inpatient floor.  While this helped, 
there were often no good candidates to transfer off the unit, and it was not a standard 
practice that could be easily monitored.  While the process for patient movement between 
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the ED and the MICU had drastically improved, leaders knew that in order to improve 
further, additional connections throughout the system had to be improved as well.   
Phase II: Cross-Unit Collaboration and Process Improvement (June - September 
2010) 
After a few months of refining the process between the ED and the MICU, the 
lessons learned were extended to the SICU.  The SICU is the second largest and most 
widely utilized ICU.  The nurse manager for the area became heavily involved in the 
process improvement efforts and became a champion for achieving similar success.  The 
multidisciplinary team reevaluated the connections in the ICU patient flow network to 
determine the next step.  In the first few months of the effort it was clear that the MICU 
consistently had a higher occupancy than the SICU.  It was determined that there were a 
few patient diagnoses, primarily trauma and non-trauma neurology (stroke) patients, who 
could be sent to either the MICU or the SICU.  Leadership in the SICU decided to take 
these patients directly from the ED in an effort to level occupancy between the MICU 
and SICU and reduce last-minute patient moves between departments.  While the volume 
between the ED and the SICU was previously minimal, the process improvement 
strengthened this connection in order to improve whole-system functioning.  This 
connection became the second dyad for improvement in the process. 
While there was previously little direct volume between the ED and the SICU, the 
plan to have the SICU take all stroke cases meant there would be a significant volume 
increase along this connection.  Leadership took the lessons learned between ED and the 
MICU and applied the same thinking to the cross-unit connection between the ED and the 
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SICU.  The SICU, though, did not utilize an ENIT nurse and did not feel as though that 
process would work for their area.  In keeping with a singular, direct connection between 
departments, leadership decided that all urgent calls for patient transfer would be directed 
to one midlevel provider in the SICU.   
Baseline data had already been collected on the time from admission to arrival in 
the SICU.  This data was monitored on a daily basis, and the SICU midlevel adopted the 
use of a logbook similar to the hospitalist and the MICU ENIT nurse.  Within the first 
month, transfer times had dropped significantly to all units: the MAT, MICU, and SICU.   
While transfer times continued to drop across the board, it was apparent that 
coordination of moves between the ICU units was still taking too long.  Leadership felt 
that while coordination between the ED and the units had improved remarkably, cultural 
barriers to coordinating patient moves between ICUs still delayed patient movement 
when the overall system census was high.  The connection between the MICU and the 
MAT, though highly utilized, regularly communicated patient moves and was not felt to 
be a high priority for improvement.  This is largely due to the fact that both units fall 
under the umbrella of the Department of Medicine, have the same leadership, and share 
nursing and physician staff.  The connection between the MICU and the SICU, on the 
other hand, was felt to be the next most logical area for improvement. 
In order to improve the connection between the MICU, MAT, and SICU, 
leadership felt as though there needed to be a daily communication between the clinical 
leaders in each area.  This effort was extended to include the CTICU and bed 
coordination to ensure that all areas had a similar understanding of overall occupancy and 
patient severity in each unit.  Each leader would utilize a standard template so that all 
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units were providing similar information.  The items on the template included overall unit 
occupancy, expected operating room transfers to the SICU and CTICU, and number of 
potentially stable patients.  Bed coordination was included since it is responsible for 
coordinating any patient movement from the ICUs to the inpatient floors.  The daily, 
multidisciplinary huddle occurred at the beginning of each day shift and lasted less than 
ten minutes.  If any patient moves had to be coordinated between units throughout the 
day, the nurse leaders involved in the daily huddle would contact each other directly. 
While the daily huddle became an integral part of preparing for each day in the 
MAT, MICU, SICU, and even with bed coordination, it did not become a habit for the 
CTICU.  As the connections between the ED and SICU and the MAT/MICU and SICU 
were strengthened, the overall time from admission to arrival in the ICU continued to 
drop.  While the team had not been able to consistently meet the 100 minute goal, the 
patient safety initiative was being recognized by executive and senior leadership in 
numerous venues across the organization and the team‘s efforts continued to evolve and 
improve as problems arose.   
Phase III: System-Wide Improvement (September - November 2010) 
At this point in the process improvement effort there were two connections that 
had not been addressed and were far from ideal: the MICU/SICU and CTICU connection 
and the ICU and Inpatient Floor connections.  Leadership felt that it would be too 
difficult to engage the CTICU in further collaboration due to the numerous restrictions 
that had been placed on what type of patients could utilize CTICU beds.  Furthermore, it 
was not a connection that had been highly utilized in the past.  All team members felt that 
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the next major area for improvement was between the ICUs and the floors.  The biggest 
barrier for the ICUs to move patients out of their unit to make room was the time it took 
to get a floor nurse on the phone to facilitate the handoff report.  This issue had been 
present for years and many were not optimistic in the ability to improve the timeliness of 
handoffs between the ICUs and all fourteen inpatient floors across the organization. 
The effort to engage the floors in an efficient and effective process for patient 
movement was the final and most difficult step in the system-wide improvement 
initiative.  The chief nursing officer supported the effort and challenged each floor‘s 
nurse manager to reduce the time between first contact for handoff and the time the 
handoff actually occurred.  ICU nursing began to track the time they would place a call to 
the floor for a patient move and the time the request was answered by the receiving nurse.  
While senior leadership supported improving this longstanding issue, the nurse managers 
closest to the process were not thoroughly engaged and had a difficult time problem 
solving.  The adversarial relationships that had been established throughout the years 
between units made open and honest communication about opportunities for 
improvement difficult.  Additionally, instead of focusing on improving one connection at 
a time in an iterative fashion, all connections between the ICUs and medical and surgical 
floors were being monitored on the same metric with little to no problem solving and 
adjustment.  While the ability to quickly transfer patients into the ICU is often dependent 
on the ability of the floors to quickly move stable ICU patients onto their floors, the 
connections between the ICUs and the floors continued to be a struggle for the team and 
for the system as a whole.  While the overall time from admission to ICU had 
dramatically improved over the course of ten months, the lack of engagement from 
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leaders on the inpatient floors made it difficult to achieve the goal the team established in 
the wake of the two sentinel events.   
After the first six months of improvement the connections between the ED, 
MICU, MAT, and SICU were well-established, but the process continued to evolve.  
Maintaining the process became especially challenging during the busy winter months.  
The team, though, had started to utilize problem solving between units to continually 
refine and improve the process.  While there were a few relapses in the process, most 
noticeably between the ED and the MAT the team was able to utilize the plan, do, check, 
adjust cycle to continually improve both the process and their overall ability to 
coordinate and adapt to unexpected and urgent patient needs.   
 
EVIDENCE OVER TIME 
 
The following tables chronicle the system-wide patient safety initiative described 
in the previous chapter.  Excerpts are provided from the semi-structured interviews 
conducted during the first five months of study to provide context throughout the 
improvement effort as it was extended across the organization.  Additionally, transfer 
times between the ED and the ICUs show the longitudinal impact of the effort on timely 
care for critical patients.  
Qualitative Evidence 
The following tables highlight comments that provide insight to the ability of 
cross-unit teams to improve both the structure and self-diagnostic nature of each 
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connection over time.   The cross-unit connections are first grouped by their ability (or 
inability) to utilize structured and self-diagnostic connections to problem solve and 
continually improve.  Structure refers to the ability of each dyad to clearly define a 
process with expected outcomes.  As cross-unit expectations are established, deviations 
become increasingly salient and provide a basis for problem solving.  The self-diagnostic 
nature of each connection refers to the ability of the units to collectively respond to those 
deviations and problem solve for continual process improvement.   
The following tables showcase how cross-unit connections evolved over time to 
create a clearly defined, structured process capable of problem solving for system-wide 
improvement to critical care patient safety.   These tables provide context to the 
quantitative assessment of ‗ED to ICU Time‘ as the initiative evolved.  For example, 
Table 10 captures comments regarding the evolution of structure between the ED and the 
ICU while Table 11 captures comments regarding the evolution of problem solving, or 
the self-diagnostic capability, between the ED and the ICU.  Within these tables, 
comments are coded by the unit in which the commenting team member works.  For 
example, in Table 10, to get all perspectives on the evolution of the improvement efforts, 
we interviewed leaders, physicians, and nurses within the ED, MICU/SICU, and Bed 
Coordination.  While Bed Coordination is not a physical unit that patients visit, the Bed 
Coordinators help to facilitate movement between the ED and the MICU and therefore 
have very valuable insights regarding issues and improvements to the coordination along 
this dyad.   
The open format of the interviews allowed interviewees to reflect on 
communication and problem solving before the initiative as well as the current evolution 
1
1
9
 
 
119 
 
and improvements to the various connections.  Multiple individuals were interviewed 
from each unit.  Interviews were transcribed and provide the case study with a body of 
longitudinal dialogue rich in context.   
The first column in each table shows comments from team members before the 
improvement effort began for each cross-unit connections.  The second column in each 
table notes team member comments taken during the initial stages of the process 
improvement effort for each dyad, or cross-unit connection.  The final column highlights 
comments that were captured after several iterations of the improvement effort along 
each dyad.  These three columns are then categorized, as shown along the bottom of each 
table, to show the progressive effectiveness of each cross-unit connection to establish 
structured or self-diagnostic connections in the system-wide effort to improve ICU 
patient safety.
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Table 10: Comments over Time Regarding Structure between the ED and ICU 
  
                           ED to ICU: Organic Improvement to Cross-Unit Structure 
Dyad Node       Before          During             After 
E
D
 t
o
 I
C
U
 
 
ED 
 
―The process was manipulated 
by different people to suit their 
needs.   It was haphazard.  You 
can't talk to the charge nurse, but 
you could talk to the MAT nurse.  
It wasn't clear at all.‖ 
 
 
 
―The ED provider calls another 
provider.  They accept the patient.  They 
need to notify the charge nurse or ENIT 
nurse in the MICU and say, we have a 
patient in the ED.‖ 
 
 
―Once we make -- the ED provider 
makes the decision that a person needs 
to go to the ICU, he calls the 
[hospitalist].  The [hospitalist] attending 
then talks to the ENIT.  It's dramatic; I 
mean there's no comparison.‖ 
Bed 
Coord. 
―Bed coordination, as an 
afterthought, was told ‗we‘re 
moving this patient from this 
unit or floor to this floor.‘  So we 
were double booking beds.‖ 
 
―[Previously] we were just concerned 
with the patient coming out of the ED 
and finding them a bed.  Now, it‘s more 
of a system-wide perspective where I 
look at the entire value stream, from the 
time the admission happens to the time a 
patient is discharged and all the 
interfaces in-between.‖ 
―The next step was, okay, let's put 
standard work in place, standards in 
place that says, okay, this is the 
process.  This is step one, step two, step 
three.  And instead of being just an ICU 
department process, it was more of a 
flow process.‖ 
ICU ―There's a lack of 
communication at times.  
Providers that just aren't ready to 
call the ENIT nurse or get the 
ball rolling with getting the 
patient somewhere or just aren't 
familiar with the process and sit 
on people. ― 
 
 
 
[Low Structure] 
―[With the new process] if there's a 
patient crashing on the floor, the ENIT 
gets a call, if there's a patient that needs 
to come up from the ED, the ENIT gets 
a call.‖ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Medium Structure] 
―A lot of the problem with flow, 
months ago, was when you were getting 
different calls from different places.  
We weren't always getting the patients 
to the right place in a timely fashion.  
So, instead of having two people try to 
orchestrate this, one person is [the 
contact] and that's their sole 
responsibility.‖ 
 
 
[High Structure] 
  
    
1
2
1
 
Table 11: Comments over Time Regarding Problem Solving between the ED and ICU 
  
                                 ED to ICU: Organic Improvement to Cross-Unit Problem Solving 
 
Dyad Node         Before             During                 After 
E
D
 t
o
 I
C
U
 
 
ED 
 
―You finally contact the charge nurse 
upstairs and [they say] "we never 
heard about this patient." We'll have 
two, three ICU patients down here for 
sixteen hours or eight hours that 
nobody knows about.‖ 
 
―Right now, things have changed a little; 
I pick up the hospitalist phone, since we 
have this kind of direct line to get a hold 
of the hospitalist. So, I'll pick it up and 
say, hey, what's going.‖ 
 
―The hospitalists still find the feedback that 
the patient didn't move appropriately or 
quickly enough very threatening.  I mean, a 
lot of times their feeling is that they're being 
singled out.  And I have to just keep telling 
them, this isn't about you.  We're looking 
for your input.‖ 
Bed 
Coord. 
―There were no metrics or 
measurements put in place, [and 
therefore] there were no escalations 
[when the process didn‘t work].‖ 
―We [realized] how important it was for 
the leaders to be involved in the 
feedback and escalation process, which 
they all didn‘t understand at first.‖ 
―It didn't work right off the bat.  What 
needed to happen, is there needed to be 
monitoring on a daily, hourly basis by 
individuals.  And when it didn't work, 
correct it right then.  And if there were 
issues right then, it escalated.  That 
probably took four to six weeks.‖ 
 
ICU ―We hear about [problems] after the 
fact, that there's somebody that's 
looking into it.  But usually we have 
to bear the brunt of being at fault, 
whether justified or not.‖ 
 
 
[No Problem Solving] 
―If a patient has been identified as 
needing an ICU and they‘re sitting there 
and nobody has moved them yet, then it 
escalates to the off-shift director.‖ 
 
 
 
[Infrequent Problem Solving] 
―Things happen and we found out where the 
barriers are and what the glitches are [and 
we adjust our process accordingly].‖ 
 
 
 
 
[Frequent Problem Solving] 
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Table 12: Comments over Time Regarding Structure between ICUs 
  
                           ICU to ICU: Organic Improvement to Cross-Unit Structure 
Dyad Node         Before        During             After 
IC
U
 t
o
 I
C
U
 
 
MICU/MAT 
 
―I mean, when you're talking to one 
of these nurses and they're giving 
you a hard time, it's like they don't 
even realize that you're not doing 
this by choice.  You don't want to 
give up this patient to take an 
admission that's even sicker.  But 
they just don't seem to understand 
that.‖  
 
 
―CTICU is still a problem.  I don't 
know for sure, but I believe they 
still have empty beds.  Or, like I 
said, beds filled with non-critically 
ill patients just to fill the beds.‖ 
 
 
 
 
 
―Now we have a very good 
understanding of where we're at to start 
the day [because of the critical care 
morning huddle].‖ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SICU ―I think it‘s just a global ownership 
thing.  I think a lot of times there 
are just too many parties involved.‖ 
 
 
 
 
 
―But now with the evolution [we‘re 
taking] the stroke admissions.  And 
that was an attempt to unload the 
MICU I think of beds and to utilize 
where we had openings.‖  
 
 
 
―I think [clearly defining] the people 
that are involved in communication 
makes a difference.  And the other big 
thing that I think we need to continue to 
improve upon is having a more 
collaborative critical care environment 
where we actually coordinate these 
things together.‖ 
 
 
CTICU ―It's not written anywhere that I 
know of, but we don't want to take 
anyone that is on any kind of 
precautions.  We only have four 
isolation rooms in our unit.  So, we 
won't take anyone that's on 
precautions or has an unexplained 
elevated white count or 
temperature.‖ 
 
[Low Structure] 
―And I didn't realize this, but I 
guess apparently the bed 
coordinators don't use our beds as 
boarding beds.‖ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Low Structure] 
―In the process, the barriers end up 
being the communication.  Because, 
you know, what is really going on -- 
what is real to me might not be real to 
you.  So that it's much more difficult to 
classify patients by acuity and to, you 
know, really figure out who can stay 
and who can go.‖ 
 
 
[Medium Structure] 
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     Table 13: Comments over Time Regarding Problem Solving between ICUs 
  
               ICU to ICU: Mechanistic attempt to Improve Cross-Unit Problem Solving 
Dyad Node Before During After 
IC
U
 t
o
 I
C
U
 
 
MICU/MAT 
 
―In terms of safety [metrics], I 
don‘t know specific ones, like 
errors we may have made.  That‘s 
not something that we‘ve shared 
amongst the whole group.‖  
 
―Root cause seems to happen a lot.  
You know, just communication with 
emails, everybody checking their log 
sheets.  It's a lot of emailing he 
said/she said stuff.  And I don't think 
that's effective at all right now.  It's 
only adding to the issues.‖ 
 
―We look at the information every day.  
And if there was an outlier, then we will 
pull out the record and we will try to 
calmly figure out what didn't work and 
then as a whole explain to everybody this 
is why the process didn't work and this is 
what should have happened.‖ 
SICU ―I think a lot of it is he said/she 
said.  You don't really have hard 
data.  So, it's hard to, you know, 
sort of comment or troubleshoot 
when you say, oh, there's this 
delay in transfer.  And then people 
say, ‗what do you mean there's a 
delay in transfer?‘‖   
 
 ―I think right now we're in the 
process of working on figuring a way 
to collect that data, what time the 
[SICU] midlevel was contacted.  
From that period of time, what time 
was the patient in the door, and what 
time did we close out.‖ 
―We have to correct our problems and 
have goals that are set.  And if we don‘t 
meet those goals, then we have to look at 
the ways that we need to make changes 
to improve upon them.‖ 
CTICU ―Most of the times I have patients 
myself.  So, sometimes, you know, 
someone is waiting on the phone 
for me for a few minutes or I have 
to wait for that other charge nurse 
for a few minutes on the phone.  
But I don‘t know that that's -- I 
mean, that's just expected.‖   
 
 
[No Problem Solving] 
―From the CT standpoint, 
everybody's discharge instructions 
are written by seven o'clock.  But on 
the medical side, when the providers 
don't see the patients until three or 
four o'clock in the afternoon, they're 
being discharged at seven o'clock at 
night, that's not a nursing problem.‖   
 
 
[No Problem Solving] 
―When [problems] have been pointed out 
to me I've really tried to look at the 
whole situation and see whether there 
really was an open bed, whether anybody 
really explored the use of the CTICU 
beds, which is certainly a barrier.‖   
 
 
 
 
[Infrequent Problem Solving] 
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            Table 14: Comments over Time Regarding Structure & Problem Solving between the ICUs and Floor Units 
  
      ICU to Floor: Mechanistic Attempt to Improve Cross-Unit Structure and Problem Solving 
Dyad Node Before During After 
 I
C
U
 t
o
 F
lo
o
r 
 
I
ICU 
 
―The residents take a long time 
getting transfer orders written.  You 
got to keep calling any time you 
change your shift.‖  
  
―It's also been good that we have taken 
ownership of who we want moved.  
And we, meaning us, the hospitalist, 
saying that this is a patient we feel is a 
better inpatient.‖   
 
―But now what we're doing is, the 
nurses who are covering for the one that 
may be at lunch takes report and we can 
still get the patient into the other [floor].  
I haven't heard that they're at lunch 
because they know that's not acceptable 
anymore.‖   
F
Floor 
―So, just knowing who to contact 
and who to communicate with, you 
know, can be a barrier.  I think the 
EMR (Electronic Medical Record) 
will solve some, but it's not the 
answer to everything.  I mean, 
people need to communicate.‖   
 
[Low Structure] 
 ―Now, we have the docs involved, we 
have the ENIT involved, the nurse 
manager from ICU is being charged to 
get the patients out within an hour.   I 
finally said, what the heck is this?  You 
know, you're wasting my time because 
I'm talking to too many people.‖    
 
[Low Structure] 
―We [now] document when we call the 
ENIT nurse. And then the ENIT nurse is 
supposed to put in the progress notes 
that she came, saw the patient, what her 
feelings were, and that she talked to the 
doctors and feels that the patient needs 
to go to intensive care.‖  
 
[Medium Structure] 
 
I
ICU 
 
―It's always difficult to get anybody 
to answer you on the floor.  It's 
frustrating, but it's also something 
we've come to expect.  So, I almost 
always start with a charge nurse.‖   
 
―We can't give report… even though 
we are all under the same motto that 
we take report and move our patients 
in thirty minutes.  It's an ongoing 
battle.  Even escalating to the nurse 
managers isn't always effective.‖   
 
―A lot of times you call to give report 
and you're left on hold for a number of 
minutes until we give up and hang up 
and then call back.  Finding the nurses 
that are going to be accepting the patient 
is very time consuming.‖   
F
Floor 
―Trust is a barrier because if you do 
it wrong for so long, no one is ever 
going to trust that you finally could 
get it right.‖   
 
 
 
[No Problem Solving] 
 
―Honestly, the nurse managers can be 
very defensive about their nurses.  And 
we find, we don‘t take our nurses 
being criticized too easily and we 
become very defensive and we can‘t 
have open communication.‖ 
 
[No Problem Solving] 
 ―I think the biggest issue is that we 
don‘t have enough collaboration 
between staff.  We have partial 
collaboration between managers, which 
is good if they‘re not trying to protect 
their little chicks.‖ 
 
[No Problem Solving] 
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Quantitative Evidence 
The time, in minutes, from admission in the ED to transfer to the ICU was 
measured for the MICU, MAT, and the SICU.  This data was collected and reviewed 
daily and was tracked over time as shown below in Figure 13.      
 
13: ED to ICU Transfer Times 
 
The first few months of the initiative had the largest impact on transfer time to the 
ICU.  During this time, the connections between the ED and the MICU/MAT/SICU had 
become structured and frequent problem solving was utilized to continually improve.  
The small improvements from July to August correspond to the increased structure and 
coordination between the MICU, MAT, and SICU.  Overall coordination between the 
ICUs moved from low to medium structure, and from no problem solving to infrequent 
problem solving.  The final phase (after September) corresponds to the little, if any, 
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coordination improvements made between the ICUs and the floors.  Furthermore, the 
final months showcase the difficulty in maintaining and improving the process during the 
higher volume months of January and February.  Without the cooperation of the floors to 
quickly move stable patients out of the ICUs, meeting and sustaining the 100 minute goal 
was difficult.   Despite the minimal improvement of these remaining connections, the 
team was able to adjust over time to achieve a lead time of 120 minutes between 
admission in the ED and arrival to the ICU.   
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In this study, semi-structured interviews, which focus on cross-unit coordination, 
provide the context for understanding how process improvement initiatives are iteratively 
extended across an organization.  The following themes emerged from triangulation of 
the interviews, quantitative data, and participant observation.   
Organic vs. Mechanistic Approaches to Improvement 
The approach to process improvement can change as an initiative is extended 
throughout the interdependent units of a complex system.  While the initial approach to 
improvement was organically driven by leaders who were sincerely motivated by ill-fated 
delays in patient care, the final phase of the effort became increasingly mechanistic.  
When leadership was sincerely engaged in the effort, a culture of problem solving was 
established as historic barriers between units were replaced by coordination and 
continuous improvement towards a common goal of improved patient safety.  Creating an 
environment where problems are openly identified can be difficult for team members and 
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requires the consistent support and attention from leadership.  Instead of fostering a new 
way of thinking, the final phase of the effort was mechanistically dictated to leaders on 
the inpatient floors and continuous problem solving declined.   
The team knew that in order to meet the goal established by the team, the 
inpatient floors would have to quickly respond to move stable patients out of the ICUs to 
make room for the urgent transfer of critical patients into the ICUs.  As the initiative 
gained the attention of senior leadership, the engagement of leaders on the inpatient 
floors was top-down instead of bottom-up.  Instead of mechanistically dictating next 
steps towards the end of an already successful initiative, senior leaders could have 
utilized the advantages of a mechanistic approach to help sustain previous achievements 
through standardization and encouraged future improvements through leadership support 
and recognition. 
  Furthermore, the once iterative approach to improvement moved to one large 
attempt at creating a ―best practice‖ across all ICU to inpatient floor connections.  While 
senior leadership had the good intentions of further improving patient safety, 
departmental leaders were not engaged in the same natural, organic way as leaders in the 
ED and ICUs.  Instead of utilizing a top-down, mechanistic approach to engage all other 
units, senior leaders could have supported the iterative extension of the process to other 
units by engaging new leaders one-by-one to utilize PDCA and standardization to both 
improve and maintain the gains.  While the difference in approach was not a conscious 
decision, it did have a significant impact on the ability to problem solve and continuously 
improve the connections from the ICUs to the inpatient floors.  Without the sincere and 
thoughtful engagement of these leaders as well as senior leader support to standardize 
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and maintain improvements, downstream cross-unit coordination did not improve and the 
overall initiative struggled to achieve its goal.  On the other hand, when leaders were 
sincerely engaged, countermeasures were created, tested, and continuously refined in a 
combined effort to improve patient safety.   
Structured and Self-Diagnostic Connections 
Complex interdependencies can make system-wide improvement difficult, but 
when multiple components work together to iteratively improve towards a common goal, 
the collective improvement efforts are often greater than the sum of individual 
improvements.  Additionally, the increased ability to coordinate and adjust allows for a 
more resilient and responsive organization.  In order to capitalize on the benefits of 
inherent complexity, the connections must be able to clearly define internal customer and 
supplier expectations.  This cross-unit process structure is the first step in making 
deviations immediately visible and is the basis for frequent problem solving.  
Additionally, structured connections minimize the impact that cultural differences may 
have on overall coordination by clearly establishing needs and expectations.  The tension 
associated with perception between units is replaced by a binary signal of whether or not 
the defined expectations were met: yes or no (Spear, 1999).  If the answer is no, the team 
can investigate potential root causes, develop new countermeasures, and test to evaluate 
if they are effective.   
Structured dyads become the basis for self-diagnostic connections.  As 
connections become increasingly structured and self-diagnostic, they become the basis 
for both significant and sustained improvements.  More importantly, the ability to create 
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structured and self-diagnostic connections becomes the basis for continuous 
organizational learning. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
When goals require the coordination of several interdependent yet 
semiautonomous units, organic engagement across the system can be difficult.  The 
motivation created by a positive vision is vital for system-wide process improvement.  
The sincere engagement of leadership towards an effort provides the foundation for 
creating a culture that embraces continual problem solving as a habitual way of thinking.    
Once a vision is established, internal interdependencies can be evaluated by leadership 
one-by-one to determine the gap between the coordination required for the vision and the 
current state.  The case study presented utilized an organic version of the Visual 
Management approach as detailed in Chapter II.  This approach enabled leaders to 
understand interdependencies and identify the largest cross-unit gaps that were 
preventing the system from achieving its ICU patient safety goals.  The identification of 
these gaps provided a starting place and roadmap for system-wide improvement.  
As dyads are identified for improvement, units must coordinate to establish 
structured connections across these dyads to form the basis for continual problem 
identification and solving utilizing the plan, do, check, adjust cycle.  As improvements 
are made and the effort is iteratively extended across the system, lessons can be shared 
across the system and customized to meet the needs of each interdependent pair of units.  
This is what Toyota has referred to as yokoten and is witnessed in the early phases of the 
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ICU case study.  In order for the lessons learned to be organically disseminated and not 
mechanistically dictated to the next dyad for improvement, they should be thoughtfully 
adapted by leadership and team members to fit each area‘s unique operating environment.  
This learning does not attempt to reduce complexity within the system, rather it embraces 
the requisite variety required to bring a product or service to the customer and focuses on 
improving the effectiveness of each unique connection across the system.    
This work highlights the importance of the leader‘s role in establishing a vision, 
understanding interdependencies, identifying gaps, supporting problem solving, and 
organically engaging other leaders, dyad-by-dyad, for system wide process improvement.  
As improvement efforts are organically extended across the complex system, the 
organization becomes increasingly able to adapt and respond to changing and unforeseen 
patient needs.  The ability of leadership to utilize both organic and mechanistic 
approaches to improvement in the appropriate place, at the appropriate time are shown 
within this case study to be a critical factor in the creation of structured and self-
diagnostic cross-unit connections.  When organizations choose to a breadth-focused, or 
mechanistic, approach to improvement the strength of front-line leaders becomes 
increasingly important.  Specifically, these leaders should be experienced in problem 
solving as well as identifying and testing countermeasures.  When an organization does 
not have a group of leaders experienced in process improvement, a depth-based, or 
organic approach is more appropriate.  This type of approach to process improvement 
naturally engages both leaders and team members in the problem identification and 
solving.  With time, these types of organic improvement efforts will help grow leaders 
and enable the organization to utilize a more mechanistic approach for widespread 
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process improvement.  This evolution in the approach to process improvement helps 
leaders, and their team members, become more experienced in structured problem 
solving.  As these efforts are increasingly coordinated across organizational boundaries, 
the system as a whole is better able to identify errors and problem solve for improved 
functioning, patient safety, and organizational learning.   
  
 132 
 
1
3
2
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V:  CONCLUSIONS 
 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 The complexity inherent to healthcare systems can make coordinated problem 
solving and improvement difficult across organizational boundaries.  Furthermore, this 
research presents a socio-technical based methodology for the identification of gaps in 
cross-unit coordination by overlaying the technical flow network (which depicts coupling 
between units within a system) with the safety control network (which highlights the 
ability to clearly define customer requirements and problem solve with suppliers).  By 
aligning these networks, practitioners can begin to identify where gaps in the system 
exist.  This methodology prioritizes improvements to cross-unit coordination by focusing 
first on the most tightly coupled units.  Two methods are offered to aid practitioners in 
the proactive identification of gaps for widespread improvement: the Detailed Analytic 
Approach and the Visual Management Approach.  The Detailed Analytic method is 
utilized to test the implications of cross-unit coordination, as measured by the 
Coordination Assessment, in Chapter III and the results suggest that this cross-unit 
coordination has implications for quality, safety culture, and process improvement.   The 
case study in Chapter IV utilized the Visual Management Approach to attempt a system-
wide patient safety initiative.  The advantages and disadvantages of organic and 
mechanistic approaches to the iterative improvement of cross-unit connections are 
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reviewed and analyzed through both qualitative and quantitative data.   The longitudinal 
analysis presented in Chapter IV highlights the importance of cross-unit connections, 
contingency theory, and leadership support in the successful extension of improvement 
across a complex system.  
 These composite cases help to answer our three main research questions.  The 
first question that was posed was: How can complex systems tie patient safety efforts 
across interdependent, yet semiautonomous, units to enable system-wide improvement?  
To answer this question, we first showed the importance of clearly identifying each unit‘s 
internal customers and suppliers.  In order to understand the system‘s interconnectedness 
and the effectiveness of each connection, the value stream map was extended to the 
complex system through the Network Alignment approach.  The Detailed Analytic 
Approach and the Visual Management Approach to managing the complex, nonlinear 
value stream each offer a method for identification of internal customers and suppliers as 
well as the gaps that arise due to a discrepancy between the current ability to coordinate 
and the ideal.  By identifying and improving these gaps between units, organizations can 
begin to extend process improvement efforts beyond organizational boundaries for true 
system-wide improvement.   
 The second research question posed was: How can practitioners utilize the 
network alignment approach for cross-unit gap identification and how do these gaps 
impact safety culture and quality?   In Chapter III, the Anatomic Pathology case study 
shows an example of one approach to gap identification using the Detailed Analytic 
Approach.  Connections, or dyads, with larger values (given the survey structure) were 
able to highlight areas of strong interdependence, or coupling, and weak coordination.  
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This approach not only allows leaders to prioritize improvement efforts on the largest 
gaps, but by including questions regarding cross-unit coordination, documentation, and 
process improvement we were able to understand how various organizational factors 
influence safety culture, and ultimately quality.  All variables, with the exception of 
problem solving with suppliers, were associated with safety culture as shown in Table 7.  
Furthermore, safety culture was shown to be significantly associated with quality.  These 
results suggest that there are tangible areas of focus for leadership and team members 
looking to improve patient safety. Clarity of customer requirements, which is only one 
component of the Coordination Assessment, was shown to be significantly correlated 
with quality, safety culture, and process improvement efforts.   The other half of the 
Coordination Assessment, problem solving with suppliers, was not significantly 
correlated with safety culture or quality, but is likely due to unfamiliarity with problem 
solving.  While certain care givers are becoming more open to raising concerns, there 
may not be well-identified channels for problem solving with team members outside 
organizational boundaries.  Based on literature and qualitative responses, we believe that 
problem solving with suppliers will be equally correlated, if not more, with quality, safety 
culture, and process improvement and deserves attention and refinement in future work.    
The case study in Chapter III provides an example of one approach to gap identification 
as well as the impact these gaps and other organizational factors have on safety culture, 
and ultimately quality. 
 The third, and final, research question stated in this work was:  How does the 
approach to system-wide improvement impact problem solving and process improvement 
across the interdependent, yet semiautonomous departments within a complex system?  
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The case study presented in Chapter IV utilized an organic version of the Visual 
Management Approach to network alignment and highlights the importance of organic 
engagement of front-line leaders in the iterative extension of improvement efforts and the 
role of senior leadership in supporting the initiative and helping to standardize the 
iterative improvements that are made.  This organic-mechanistic hybrid approach utilizes 
the benefits of both approaches to improvement.  This hybrid approach is both contingent 
on the environment and is likely to change throughout the evolution of a system-wide 
improvement initiative.  The case study displays the importance of leadership 
engagement in the overall ability of the improvement effort to iteratively establish 
structured and self-diagnostic cross-unit connections throughout a complex system.  The 
case utilized longitudinal qualitative data to monitor the progression of cross-unit 
connections throughout the system to become structured, with clearly defined process 
expectations, and self-diagnostic, so that deviations are quickly identified and resolved.  
This data was also paired with quantitative data regarding the overall time it took for an 
ICU patient to receive the required critical care.  The case highlights the effectiveness of 
the Visual Management approach for iterative cross-unit improvements, the advantages 
and disadvantages of both organic and mechanistic leadership approaches to the 
extension of improvement efforts, and the association between structured, self-diagnostic 
cross-unit connections and system-wide improvement.   
 Each research question complements the previous question for a holistic approach 
to the identification and improvement of cross-unit gaps for system-wide improvement.  
The ability of leadership to utilize these findings to create structured and self-diagnostic 
connections throughout the complex system will impact the effectiveness of system-wide 
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problem solving which, in turn, becomes the basis for continuous organizational learning 
and improvement. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 The case studies presented in Chapters III and IV were both based on data of 
singular, embedded case studies in healthcare environments.   While both of these cases 
utilized multiple forms of data to provide a more complete picture, the findings in each 
chapter would be stronger if data was collected from multiple systems or organizations 
for comparison to enhance external validity.  This could also be accomplished by 
building upon these cases in future research.  Furthermore, it would be ideal to compare 
cross-unit coordination and quality in a complex system at Toyota to the cross-unit 
coordination and quality in a similarly complex system within healthcare.  While 
different applications, leadership engagement and the establishment of structured and 
self-diagnostic connections between units in each organization would likely provide 
additional insight into the creation and improvement of these connections as well as 
implications for quality and system-wide process improvement.   
 Another option for enhancing external validity would be to extend this work to 
other high reliability or complex applications such as nuclear energy, aviation, complex 
product development, or research and design.  This work builds on lean management 
principles as well as resilience engineering and safety culture research to contribute to the 
developing knowledge of system-wide improvement and error reduction in complex 
systems.  The next step of this work should focus on better explaining and understanding 
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how and when problem solving occurs across organizational boundaries in complex 
systems.  This may, or may not, be different in certain applications.  For example, the 
difficulties noted in Chapter III regarding statistical associations with problem solving 
with suppliers may not be present in other industries where problem identification is 
encouraged.   Future work could expand these research questions and methodologies to 
other settings and more rigorously examine the relationships between cross-unit problem 
solving and quality, safety culture, and system-wide improvement efforts.   
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APPENDICIES 
 
 
APPENDIX A: ANATOMIC PATHOLOGY SURVEY 
 
1) Please select one of the following units that most closely represents your area of 
work. 
a. UM Outpatient Clinics 
b. UM Internal Department 
c. Central Distribution 
d. Accessioning (Rm1) 
e. Accessioning (Rm2) 
f. Grossing (Rm1) 
g. Grossing (Rm2) 
h. Histology 
i. Rm1 
j. IPOX 
k. Cytopathology 
l. Special Stains 
m. Autopsy 
n. Hematopathology 
o. Molecular Diagnostics 
p. Electron Microscopy 
q. Pathologist 
r. Storage 
 
Problem Solving with Suppliers 
2) If I receive an error from each of the following areas, I would know whom to 
contact to resolve the issue, how to contact them, and I would expect an 
immediate response.  (Answer for each Supplier) 
1. Strongly Agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neutral 
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4. Disagree 
5. Strongly Disagree 
6. Not Applicable 
3) If any of your responses to the above question contained the word disagree, 
explain why is it difficult to communicate and resolve problems with that 
particular area.  What could be done to improve the current communication 
process? 
4) Errors that are passed to my area are carefully documented so that there is a clear 
record of where the error originated, type of error, and whether or not it was 
resolved. 
1. Strongly Agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neutral 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly Disagree 
5) If your area documents errors, does the documentation lead to changes that 
prevent errors from happening in the future?  Please explain. 
6) Please estimate the percentage of specimens that are sent to your area from each 
of the following: 
1. 0-10% 
2. 11-20% 
3. 21-30% 
4. 41-50% 
5. 51-60% 
6. 61-70% 
7. 71-80% 
8. 81-90% 
9. 91-100% 
10. N/A 
 
Clarity of Customer Requirements 
7) I have access to information that states exactly how a specimen should be 
prepared for the following areas: (Answer for each Customer) 
1. Strongly Agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neutral 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly Disagree 
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6. Not Applicable 
8) If you do know exactly what information is required when passing on a specimen, 
how did you learn what was necessary (training, experience, verbal reminders, 
standard operating procedures, etc.)?  If requirements are unclear, what could be 
done to improve the current situation? 
9) My area has open and effective communication with the areas below regarding 
how a specimen should be prepared and when it should arrive. (Answer for each 
Customer) 
1. Strongly Agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neutral 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly Disagree 
6. Not Applicable 
10) If any of your responses to the above question contained the word disagree, please 
explain the problem.  What could be done to improve upon the current situation? 
11) Documentation stating how to prepare a specimen is easy to locate. 
1. Strongly Agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neutral 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly Disagree 
6. Not Applicable 
12) It is common for different personnel within each of the following areas to have 
different preferences regarding specimen preparation.  (Answer for each 
Customer) 
1. Strongly Agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neutral 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly Disagree 
6. Not Applicable 
13) Estimate the percentage of specimens that are sent from your area to the following 
areas: 
1. 0-10% 
2. 11-20% 
3. 21-30% 
4. 41-50% 
5. 51-60% 
6. 61-70% 
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7. 71-80% 
8. 81-90% 
9. 91-100% 
10. N/A 
Individual Quality Perceptions 
14) I receive a specimen that has incomplete or incorrect paperwork or labeling with 
the following frequency: 
1. Once per Hour 
2. Once per Day 
3. Once per Week 
4. Once per Month 
5. Once per Year 
6. Never 
15) What is the likelihood that paperwork errors affect the accuracy of the patient‘s 
diagnosis? 
1. Very Likely 
2. Likely 
3. Possible 
4. Unlikely 
5. Very Unlikely 
16) I receive a specimen that is prepared incorrectly with the following frequency: 
1. Once per Hour 
2. Once per Day 
3. Once per Week 
4. Once per Month 
5. Once per Year 
6. Never 
17) What is the likelihood that specimen preparation errors affect the accuracy of the 
patient‘s diagnosis? 
1. Very Likely 
2. Likely 
3. Possible 
4. Unlikely 
5. Very Unlikely 
18) Do you believe that quality within the Anatomic Pathology department needs to 
be improved?  Please explain. 
Individual Safety Culture Attitudes 
19) I am consistently provided with all the necessary information to perform my job. 
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1. Strongly Agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neutral 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly Disagree 
20) If your response to the above question contained the word disagree, please explain 
why. 
21) I am encouraged by management to report any patient safety concerns I may have. 
1. Strongly Agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neutral 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly Disagree 
22) Could management be doing more to address quality and safety concerns within 
the lab?  Please explain. 
23) It is difficult for employees to ask questions when there is something that they do 
not understand. 
1. Strongly Agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neutral 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly Disagree 
24) If your response to the above question contained the word agree, please explain 
why it is difficult to ask questions.  
25) Every safety concern is given immediate attention. 
1. Strongly Agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neutral 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly Disagree 
Process Improvement Efforts 
26) Involving everyone in continuous improvement is a priority within our workplace. 
1. Strongly Agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neutral 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly Disagree 
27) Do you believe that process improvement programs will improve quality long 
term?  Please explain. 
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28) I have played an important role on a team whose goal is to improve our process. 
1. Strongly Agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neutral 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly Disagree 
29) Our area adopted a Process Improvement Program within the following time 
frame. 
1. Over 5 Years Ago 
2. 3-4 Years Ago 
3. 1-2 Years Ago 
4. Within the Past Year 
5. Never (Not Applicable) 
30) Any comments or feedback that you can add about communication, quality, or 
safety would be greatly appreciated.  Please use the box below for your 
comments. 
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APPENDIX B: ICU PATIENT FLOW INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Background Information 
1. How many years have you worked in your current position? 
2. How many years have you worked for the organization? 
3. What is your current job title / job classification? 
4. What specific goals and metrics does your unit track regarding patient safety? 
5. How do you know if you are successful? 
 
ICU Patient Movement – Process 
1. What is the process to move ICU patients to or from your unit?  Is this process 
documented anywhere? 
2. Is this process similar across shifts and personnel?   
3. What is the process for ICU patient placement if all the ICUs are full? 
 
ICU Patient Movement – Communication 
1. What type of communication occurs with the following areas during an ICU 
patient move? (Exclude respondent‘s own unit): 
Emergency Department; SICU; MICU; MAT; CTICU; Surgical Floor; 
Medical Floor; PACU; ENIT; Bed Coordination 
2. Is communication between units clear, concise, and accurate?  If not, can you give 
me an example? 
3. What are the barriers to effective and efficient communication between these 
various units?  
 
Problem Identification and Resolution 
1. Can you give examples of common problems your unit encounters when trying to 
move patients? 
2. What is the process for problem resolution between units?  For example, if a 
patient waited in the ED (or ICU for floor respondents) for 3 hours while there 
was an open bed, how does your unit respond? 
3. Can you sense when patient safety is more vulnerable?  If so, what do you do to 
adjust the current situation to minimize risk to the patient? 
4. Do you believe that ICU patient moves are a priority within the organization? 
5. What do you think is RGH‘s biggest barrier to being able to move patients to or 
from the ICU in a timely fashion? 
6. Do you believe ICU patient delays are attributable to one particular source, or is it 
a broader, systems problem? 
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